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Fiction, Culture and Pedophilia:  Fantasy and the First 
Amendment after United States v. Whorley 
Bryan Kim-Butler* 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1998, congressional and public sentiment was set ablaze by the publication of 
a seemingly esoteric academic article by three previously little-known 
psychologists.1  The article, in an American Psychological Association (“APA”) 
journal, Psychological Bulletin, challenged the “lay belie[f] that child sexual abuse 
(CSA) causes intense harm” and concluded that the common construct of child 
sexual abuse was “of questionable scientific validity.”2  The authors suggested 
further that psychologists researching child sexuality use different terms, “adult-
child sex, a value-neutral term” for “a willing encounter with positive reactions,” 
reserving “child sexual abuse, a term that implies harm to the individual,” for a 
nonconsensual experience accompanied by negative feelings.3  The National 
Association for Research and Therapy of Homosexuality (“NARTH”), a group that 
claims to “help” gays and lesbians rid themselves of “unwanted homosexuality,” 
was the first to comment.4  NARTH claimed that the APA was attempting to 
 
               *   J.D. Candidate 2011, Columbia Law School; A.B. Philosophy, Vassar College.  Thanks to 
Brittney Pescatore and Tim Cohan for their editorial comments, interest and support for this Note. 
 1. See Erica Goode, Study on Child Sex Abuse Provokes a Political Furor, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 
1999, at A33. 
 2. Bruce Rind, Philip Tromovitch & Robert Bauserman, A Meta-Analytic Examination of 
Assumed Properties of Child Sexual Abuse Using College Samples, 124 PSYCHOL. BULL. 22, 22, 46 
(1998). 
 3. Id. at 46. 
 4. See NARTH’s Mission Statement, NARTH, http://www.narth.com/menus/mission.html (last 
visited Feb. 2, 2011); see also The Three Myths of Homosexuality, NARTH, 
http://www.narth.com/menus/myths.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2011).  The American Psychological 
Association and the American Medical Association unequivocally oppose the representation of 
homosexuality as a mental disorder that can be “cured” through “conversion therapy.”  See AMA Policy 
Regarding Sexual Orientation, AMA, http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/about-ama/our-
people/member-groups-sections/glbt-advisory-committee/ama-policy-regarding-sexual-orientation.shtml 
(last visited Feb. 2, 2011); APA Council of Representatives Passes Resolution on So-Called Conversion 
Therapy, SEXUAL ORIENTATION:  SCI., EDUC., & POL’Y (Aug. 14, 1997), 
http://psychology.ucdavis.edu/rainbow/html/resolution97.html.  LGBT advocacy organizations have, 
unsurprisingly, also challenged the claims of NARTH and published findings on the harms of the “ex-
gay movement.”  See generally POLITICAL RESEARCH ASSOCS., EQUAL PARTNERS IN FAITH & THE 
POLICY INST. OF THE NAT’L GAY & LESBIAN TASK FORCE, CHALLENGING THE EX-GAY MOVEMENT:  
AN INFORMATIONAL PACKET (1998).  See also The Rind Controversy, MHAMIC, 
http://www.mhamic.org/rind/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2011). 
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“normalize pedophiles.”5  Dr. Laura Schlessinger agreed, and together with 
NARTH and the conservative organization Family Research Council, prodded 
Congress to respond.6  House Majority Whip Tom DeLay (R-Texas) and Dr. 
Schlessinger appeared at a press conference convened by the Family Research 
Council, introducing a bill requiring the APA to renounce the findings of the 
study.7  A House Resolution condemning the psychologists’ conclusions passed 
355 to zero in 1999.8  Looking back on the episode, literary critic Kathryn Bond 
Stockton comments that “Congress, it would seem, has acted only once to resolve 
against science:  in order to say that children must be harmed.”9 
The story has not changed much in the years between that late 1990s period of 
congressional sex panic and today.10  It seems likely that similar furor would result 
if a similar article were published today.  In November of 2010, popular online 
retailer Amazon.com came under fire for offering in its Kindle bookstore an e-book 
entitled The Pedophile’s Guide to Love and Pleasure.11  Amazon at first refused to 
remove the book from its site, responding, “Amazon believes it is censorship not to 
sell certain books simply because we or others believe their message is 
objectionable.  Amazon does not support or promote hatred or criminal acts, 
however, we do support the right of every individual to make their own purchasing 
decisions.”12  However, the blogosphere soon erupted with news of the book, and 
thousands threatened to boycott Amazon via Twitter.  One person “tweeted,” “Free 
speech doesn’t include a written manual on how to exploit, molest and rape our 
children.”13  Others created Facebook pages advocating boycotting Amazon until 
 
 5. KATHRYN BOND STOCKTON, THE QUEER CHILD, OR GROWING SIDEWAYS IN THE TWENTIETH 
CENTURY 69 (2009). 
 6. Dr. Laura Schlessinger and the Family Research Council are also widely known for their anti-
gay views.  See, e.g., The Rind Controversy, supra note 4. 
 7. See Judith Reisman, APA Pedophilia on the March, WORLDNETDAILY (June 1, 1999), 
http://www.wnd.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=16148 (“After the American Psychological 
Association removed pedophilia as sexual perversion in its 1994 Diagnostic and Statistical Manual IV, it 
was only a matter of time until The American Psychological Association would ease us further toward 
legalizing child sexual abuse.”). 
 8. H.R. Con. Res. 107, 106th Cong. (1999) (enacted). 
 9. STOCKTON, supra note 5, at 71. 
 10. The “Monica Lewinsky affair” is one prominent example of “congressional sex panic.”  See, 
e.g., Dana D. Nelson & Tyler Curtain, The Symbolics of Presidentialism:  Sex and Democratic 
Identification, in OUR MONICA, OURSELVES:  THE CLINTON AFFAIR AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST 34 
(Lauren Berlant & Lisa Duggan eds., 2001).  Nelson says:  “This clarifies the sexual panic that pervades 
congressional ‘outrage,’ the imperative to silence anything that does not speak from the normatively 
repressive space of the faith-demanding hetero-husband. . . . [The] terminology [of ‘constitutional 
crisis’] made us feel as though our ‘whole country’ was at stake . . . .”  Id. at 41–42. 
 11. Nick Bilton, Amazon Under Attack for Sale of Pedophile Book, N.Y. TIMES BITS BLOG (Nov. 
11, 2010, 5:10 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/11/11/amazon-under-attack-for-sale-of-
pedophile-book/?scp=1&sq=pedophilia&st=cse. 
 12. Id.; Douglas MacMillan, Amazon.com Irks Users over Pedophile Guide Sale, Defends Move, 
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Nov. 10, 2010, 5:39 PM), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-11-
10/amazon-com-irks-users-over-pedophile-guide-sale-defends-move.html. 
 13. See Hugh Collins, ‘Pedophile’s Guide’ Sparks Angry Criticism of Amazon, AOLNEWS (Nov. 
10, 2010, 3:45 PM), http://www.aolnews.com/2010/11/10/pedophiles-guide-sparks-angry-criticism-of-
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the book was gone.14  After the “online atom bomb” of the controversy, Amazon 
removed the book from its site without further comment.15  Less than forty-eight 
hours since the controversy had begun, the book’s page was replaced with the 
message “We’re sorry.  The Web address you entered is not a functioning page on 
our site.”16 
Child sexual abuse has become a prominent, even central issue in our culture.17  
Some view child sexual abuse as a national or even international emergency, a 
devastating and widespread social problem.18  Others see it, at least partly, as a 
“moral panic” full of exaggeration and hysteria.  For instance, Victorianist and 
cultural critic James Kincaid observes:  “child-molesting trials . . . the newspapers, 
advertising, and sensationalistic best-sellers all tell us there [is] a multi-billion 
dollar kiddie porn industry, and a vast network of pedophiles.”19  Laura Kipnis, a 
 
amazon/ (quoting Twitter user). 
 14. Shawn Alff, Amazon Finally Stops Selling The Pedophile’s Guide to Love and Pleasure, 
CREATIVE LOAFING, THE DAILY LOAF BLOG (Nov. 11, 2010, 9:08 AM), http: 
//blogs.creativeloafing.com/dailyloaf/2010/11/11/amazon-finally-stops-selling-the-pedophiles-guide-to-
love-and-pleasure/ (discussing “a tidal wave of angry voices on Twitter” and “two Facebook pages 
dedicated to boycotting Amazon”); Bilton, supra note 11; Nick McMaster, Twitter Users Slam Amazon 
Over ‘Pedophile’s Guide’, NEWSER (Nov. 10, 2010, 4:57 PM), http: 
//www.newser.com/story/105071/twitter-users-slam-amazon-over-pedophiles-guide.html (quoting 
Twitter user and Amazon’s refusal to stop selling the book). 
 15. Bilton, supra note 11 (“[T]he small debate exploded into an online atom bomb . . . .”); 
Claudine Beaumont, Amazon Removes ‘Paedophile Guide’ from Kindle Store, TELEGRAPH TECH. NEWS 
(Nov. 11, 2010, 12:44 PM), http: //www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/amazon/8126013/Amazon-
removes-paedophile-guide-from-Kindle-store.html (“Amazon has not given any reason for its change of 
heart.”). 
 16. Bilton, supra note 11 (containing screenshot of Amazon “We’re sorry” page). 
 17. First amendment and art law scholar Amy Adler argues that “[c]hild sexual abuse has become 
the master narrative of our culture.”  Amy Adler, The Perverse Law of Child Pornography, 101 COLUM. 
L. REV. 209, 227 (2001) [hereinafter Adler, Perverse] (citing Nancy Scheper-Hughes & Howard F. 
Stein, Child Abuse and the Unconscious in American Popular Culture, in THE CHILDREN’S CULTURE 
READER 178, 179 (Henry Jenkins ed., 1998)).  Scheper-Hughes and Stein insightfully discuss how in the 
1960s, child abuse and neglect were “medicalized,” making a new “social space,” including the creation 
of novel laws and “interventional strategies,” come into view.  See Scheper-Hughes & Stein, supra, at 
178–79.  It should also be noted that “child sexual abuse” encompasses a wide variety of types of 
behavior or exploitation.  The National Center for Missing & Exploited Children lists several types, 
including “possession, manufacture, and distribution of child pornography,” “child prostitution,” “sex 
tourism involving children,” “extra-familial child sexual molestation” and “online enticement of 
children for sexual acts.”  See Sexual Exploitation of Children, NAT’L CENTER MISSING & EXPLOITED 
CHILDREN, http://www.missingkids.com/missingkids/servlet/PageServlet?LanguageCountry= 
en_US&PageId=218 (last visited Feb. 2, 2011). 
 18. UNICEF and UNESCO, both international bodies, have convened an International 
Conference on Combating Child Pornography on the Internet, compiling a plan that includes “national 
hot lines and ‘electronic watchtowers’ to report causes of pedophilia and child pornography on the 
Internet.”  Steven Hick & Edward Halpin, Children’s Rights and the Internet, 575 ANNALS AM. ACAD. 
POL. & SOC. SCI. 56, 61 (2001).  The United Nations also instituted a special rapporteur on child 
pornography.  Id.; see also JAMES R. KINCAID, EROTIC INNOCENCE:  THE CULTURE OF CHILD 
MOLESTING  9–10 (1998) [hereinafter KINCAID, EROTIC] (discussing the sensationalistic nature of 
reports of “an ‘epidemic’ of child molesting, a ‘National Emergency’”). 
 19. KINCAID, EROTIC, supra note 18, at 20. 
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media studies scholar and cultural critic, argues: 
Pedophilia is the new evil empire of the domestic imagination: now that communism 
has been defanged, it seems to occupy a similar metaphysical status as the evil of all 
evils, with similar anxiety about security from infiltration, the similar under-the-bed 
fear that “they” walk among us undetected—fears that are not entirely groundless, but 
not entirely rational either.20 
Commenting on the effect of this rhetoric on freedom of expression, first 
amendment and art law scholar Amy Adler notes, “[I]f you mention the First 
Amendment in this context, someone might accuse you of being a pedophile.”21 
The Psychological Bulletin and Amazon affairs illustrate how pedophilia 
troubles the freedom of expression.  Congress was so aghast at the Rind-
Tromovitch-Bauserman article that it felt the need to pass a resolution condemning 
it.  Amazon, on the other hand, defended itself against what it perceived to be 
“censorship”—until the controversy became overwhelming. 
Considering these phenomena, it may be unsurprising that the area of the law 
where obscenity, pornography and children meet is where the freedom of 
expression is most, and most uncontroversially, curtailed.22  One such case is 
United States v. Whorley, decided by the Fourth Circuit in 2008.23  Briefly, a 
pedophile who enjoyed looking at illegal pictures was caught, convicted and sent to 
prison; all of his appeals were denied, including the most recent:  a 2010 denial of 
certiorari by the Supreme Court.24  More specifically, the defendant, Dwight 
Whorley, downloaded or otherwise received several dozen pictures and a handful 
of email messages depicting or involving children in various sexual situations.25  
Some of these representations were of real children.26  Other representations were 
of entirely fictional children, the figments of someone’s imagination:  allegedly 
“obscene” cartoon illustrations and descriptions of fantasies about children.27  
Whorley was prosecuted and convicted under federal child pornography and 
obscenity laws and sentenced to twenty years in prison.28  Whorley claimed, inter 
 
 20. LAURA KIPNIS, BOUND AND GAGGED:  PORNOGRAPHY AND THE POLITICS OF FANTASY IN 
AMERICA 5 (1995). 
 21. Adler, Perverse, supra note 17, at 210. 
 22. See Amy Adler, Inverting the First Amendment, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 921, 922 (2001) 
[hereinafter Adler, Inverting] (describing child pornography law as the area of law “where the greatest 
encroachments on free expression are now accepted”). 
 23. United States v. Whorley (Whorley III), 550 F.3d 326 (4th Cir. 2008), aff’g United States v. 
Whorley (Whorley I), 386 F. Supp. 2d 693 (E.D. Va. 2005) and United States v. Whorley (Whorley II), 
400 F. Supp. 2d 800 (E.D. Va. 2005), reh’g and reh’g en banc denied, United States v. Whorley 
(Whorley IV), 569 F.3d 211 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, Whorley v. United States (Whorley V), 130 S. 
Ct. 1052 (2010). 
 24. Whorley V, 130 S. Ct. at 1052 (denying certiorari without opinion). 
 25. Whorley III, 550 F.3d at 331. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 332. 
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alia, that these laws violated the First Amendment.29  A Fourth Circuit panel, 
divided two to one, upheld his convictions and sentence.30  The entire circuit, 
except the judge who had dissented on the panel, denied rehearing of the case en 
banc.31  Judge Gregory, the dissenter, concurred in upholding the convictions 
relating to the representations of actual children, but dissented as to the upholding 
of the convictions relating to the cartoon pictures and emails.32  He also dissented 
to the denial of rehearing, urging Whorley to seek certiorari (which Whorley did, to 
no avail).33 
Recently, some have taken a critical view of the legal treatment of crimes 
involving pedophilia and child pornography.  Religion scholar and historian Philip 
Jenkins, for instance, notes that: 
Viewing child porn material is a criminal offense, in a legal environment in which it is 
all but impossible for even the most inept of prosecutors to lose a case.  Nor, given the 
horror attached to the offense, is there likely to be much public outcry about judicial 
railroading: in this area of law, only the most egregious cases of police entrapment 
have inspired any media complaints whatever.34 
Both Jenkins and Adler notice that there is no “liberal” or “libertarian” position 
on child pornography, “no minoritarian school that upholds the rights of individuals 
to pursue their private pleasures.”35  Some of the reasons for this absence might be 
sound:  for instance, there is a suspicion that “the subjects of child pornography 
cannot give any form of informed or legal consent to their involvement . . . and 
[that] even when children are just depicted nude, they are subject to actual 
molestation.”36 
However, a suspicion based on technical legal definitions does not shed much 
light on the emotion and intensity of the attention given to child sexual abuse.  A 
comment on a case like Whorley thus must involve a wider social narrative than the 
one told in the legal cases involving pedophilia.37  One aspect of this wider 
 
 29. Id.; Whorley I, 386 F. Supp. 2d 693, 695 (E.D. Va. 2005). 
 30. Whorley III, 550 F.3d at 343. 
 31. Whorley IV, 569 F.3d 211 (4th Cir. 2009). 
 32. Whorley III, 550 F.3d at 353 (Gregory, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 33. Whorley IV, 569 F.3d at 214 (Gregory, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc). 
 34. PHILIP JENKINS, BEYOND TOLERANCE:  CHILD PORNOGRAPHY ON THE INTERNET 19 (2001). 
 35. Id. at 4; Adler, Perverse, supra note 17, at 210 (“There is not an acceptable ‘liberal’ position 
when it comes to the sexual victimization of children.”). 
 36. JENKINS, supra note 34, at 4. 
 37. What constitutes “pedophilia” and who are “pedophiles” is not entirely clear or 
uncontroversial.  See Dawn Fisher, Tony Ward & Anthony R. Beech, Pedophilia, in PRACTITIONER’S 
GUIDE TO EVIDENCE-BASED PSYCHOTHERAPY 531, 531 (Jane E. Fisher & William T. O’Donohue eds., 
2006).  Fisher, Ward and Beech write: 
The term pedophile has come to be used variously in the scientific and journalistic literature, 
ranging from being used loosely to describe all individuals who sexually molest children through 
to a more restrictive subset of child molesters who are only sexually attracted to children.  Not 
surprisingly this has led to confusion as to what the term actually means and what type of person 
is being included in this category. 
Id.  The etiology, or causal basis, of pedophilia has been posited to be biological.  See, e.g., Are Some 
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understanding has been explored by critics like James Kincaid.  His book Child-
Loving:  The Erotic Child and Victorian Culture lends disturbing insight into how 
we think about pedophiles and children.  There, he writes: 
The scenes we enact in our heads answer to and promote needs so insistent they are 
not going to depend on books alone for their exercise.  The fictions we engender have 
a wider scope, and we find ourselves able to construct them not simply or even mainly 
by way of novels.  We plot the life about us in much the same way, find means for 
dramatizing our desires and their necessary protections through movies, television, the 
schools, the athletic fields, the playground, the daycare center, and the courtroom. . . . 
By creating gothic melodramas, monster stories of child-molesting and playing them 
out periodically (often), we provide not just titillation but assurances of righteousness.  
Demonizing the child-molester much as we demonize Alec d’Urberville, we can 
connect to a pedophile drama while pretending to shut down the theater.38 
Kincaid’s argument is as important as it is unsettling.  He argues that rather than 
standing apart from pedophilia and objectively judging child molestation and 
pornography, we are ourselves implicated; in fact, the intensity of our attention 
indicates how close we want to remain to pedophilia, how it satisfies a strange 
cultural need.  Pedophilia occupies a space of fascination and emotion for us.  But, 
Kincaid argues, rather than dealing with that fascination and emotion, we create a 
“gothic melodrama” in which the situation is painted in terms of good versus evil, 
“us” versus “them.”  We are not only playwrights and directors in the “theater” of 
pedophilia, but also we are the righteous, observing spectators. 
Professor Adler similarly reads the wildly popular television special series 
“Dateline NBC:  To Catch a Predator with Chris Hansen” as a show structured by 
its audience’s (our) pleasure in engaging in the fantasy (she calls it a “highly 
scripted S&M scene”) of the prospective child molester, caught red-handed by the 
“preppy father figure.”39  Adler asks:  what is so entertaining or pleasurable about 
 
Men Predisposed to Pedophilia?, SCIENCEDAILY (Oct. 23, 2007), http://www.sciencedaily.com/ 
releases/2007/10/071022120203.htm; Pedophiles Have Deficits in Brain Activation, Study Suggests, 
SCIENCEDAILY (Sept. 24, 2007), http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2007/09/070920091209.htm.  
Pedophilia has also been theorized to be best conceptualized “at the intersection of sociology and 
biology, sociobiology.”  See M. Ashley Ames & David A. Houstin, Legal, Social, and Biological 
Definitions of Pedophilia, 19 ARCHIVES OF SEXUAL BEHAV. 333, 339–40 (1990).  My reference to 
“actual pedophiles” is meant to comport with definitions of pedophilia most commonly accepted in the 
psychological literature on the subject.  A good summary is found in Michael Seto’s survey of the 
literature, touching on what is commonly accepted regarding the definition and some of the complexities 
of the term “pedophilia.”  Michael C. Seto, Pedophilia:  Psychopathology and Theory, in SEXUAL 
DEVIANCE:  THEORY, ASSESSMENT, AND TREATMENT 164 (D. Richard Laws & William T. O’Donohue 
eds., 2d ed. 2008).  See also generally, SARAH D. GOODE, UNDERSTANDING AND ADDRESSING ADULT 
SEXUAL ATTRACTION TO CHILDREN:  A STUDY OF PAEDOPHILES IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY (2010); 
MICHAEL C. SETO, PEDOPHILIA AND SEXUAL OFFENDING AGAINST CHILDREN:  THEORY, ASSESSMENT, 
AND INTERVENTION (2008). 
 38. JAMES R. KINCAID, CHILD-LOVING:  THE EROTIC CHILD AND VICTORIAN CULTURE 341 
(1992). 
 39. Amy Adler, To Catch a Predator, 20 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. (forthcoming 2011) 
[hereinafter Adler, To Catch a Predator] (based on Amy Adler, Remarks at Columbia Law School:  A 
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the show?  She argues that there is pleasure or satisfaction in two modes of 
viewing:  one, the familiar condemnation of the “child predator” who has shown up 
at the house we all know is bugged to the gills with microphones and hidden 
cameras, ready for sex with a minor; the other, a much more unsettling alignment 
with the predator.40  We, the audience, watch Hansen, the host, read back to the 
predator the fantasies he has chatted online about.41  He begs Hansen to stop.42  We 
tune in to hear these transcripts and thus involve ourselves in the fantasies they 
contain.43  Adler insightfully argues that our extreme and punitive legal responses 
to the “child predator” are based on a disavowal of our own identification with the 
predator.44  To avoid the appearance of “sympathy” with “predation” (all the while 
reveling in the drama, the pleasure and the theater of it) we engage in what Freud 
might call an “ego split.”45 
 
Symposium Honoring the Contributions of Professor Judith Butler to the Scholarship and Practice of 
Gender and Sexuality Law (March 5, 2010)). 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Freud discusses “disavowal” on a number of occasions.  For instance, in discussing the early 
appearance of penis envy, he writes: 
[W]hen a little boy first catches sight of a girl’s genital region, he begins by showing irresolution 
and lack of interest; he sees nothing or disavows what he has seen, he softens it down or looks 
about for expedients for bringing it into line with his expectations.  It is not until later, when 
some threat of castration has obtained a hold upon him, that the observation becomes important 
to him:   if he then recollects or repeats it, it arouses a terrible storm of emotion in him and forces 
him to believe in the reality of the threat which he has hitherto laughed at. 
SIGMUND FREUD, SOME PSYCHICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE ANATOMICAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE 
SEXES (1925), reprinted in THE FREUD READER 670, 673–74 (Peter Gay ed., 1989) (emphasis added).  
A few years later, Freud introduced disavowal—instead of his previously posited repression—as the 
mechanism by which fetishes grew.  See 21 SIGMUND FREUD, Fetishism, in THE STANDARD EDITION OF 
THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD 152 (James Strachey et al. eds., James 
Strachey trans., 1961) (1927).  Later, in another revision and summarization, Freud: 
described disavowal as a defense available when the need to preserve the reality-testing function 
comes into conflict with the perception of a significant environmental reality that is potentially 
traumatic.  Unable to simply turn away, a compromise is formed that attempts to serve both the 
pleasure and the reality principle.  This is accomplished by bringing about an ego split, one arm 
of which acknowledges the reality, while the other repudiates the meaning of the perception and 
substitutes a fantasy that protects the individual from the anxiety he would otherwise have to 
face.  Disavowal defends against anxiety-provoking external perceptions and is the counterpart 
of repression, repression being directed toward similar demands from the inner world of the 
instincts. 
Michael Franz Basch, The Perception of Reality and the Disavowal of Meaning, 11 ANN. 
PSYCHOANALYSIS 125, 135 (1983) (discussing 23 SIGMUND FREUD, An Outline of Psycho-Analysis, in 
THE STANDARD EDITION OF THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD 141) (James 
Strachey et al. eds, James Strachey trans., 1964) (1940)).  More detail would require more depth than 
there is room for here, but the relevant demonstration is that disavowal, in the psychoanalytic contexts of 
sex and sexuality formation, the individual and civilization, is a highly important process that is not only 
surrounded by phobic projections and narratives (such as the denial of castration anxiety), but also 
operatively attached to the neuroses of individuals and societies.  See generally HENRY KRIPS, FETISH:  
AN EROTICS OF CULTURE (1999).  When Adler calls the audience’s reaction to the “predators” of “To 
KIM-BUTLER Corrections.docx 5/13/2011  3:47 PM 
552 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF LAW & THE ARTS [34:3 
 
Sexuality studies scholar Steven Angelides, asking “Why does the very mention 
of pedophilia evoke such fear, anxiety, and panic among so many people?” also 
importantly asks, “[W]hat unconscious forces might be at work?”46  He argues that 
“the discursive field of pedophilia is contained largely within a neurotic 
structure.”47  He also helpfully summarizes Freudian thought on what comprises 
“neurosis”: 
[A]nxiety is the “nodal point” of neurosis, and repression the ego’s primary defense 
against it.  When disturbing or forbidden ideas threaten to emerge into consciousness, 
anxiety acts as the danger signal to the ego.  The ego attempts to defend itself against 
these intrusive thoughts, and employs the defense mechanism of repression.  When an 
individual is unable to mount a successful defense against the forbidden thoughts, 
symptoms develop.  As conflict solutions, neurotic symptoms are both signs of and 
substitutes for unconscious desires . . . . Elements of the discourse of pedophilia 
are . . . indicative of neurotic symptomatology.48 
Take the Psychological Bulletin affair of 1998–99 as an example:  the 
“disturbing or forbidden ideas” are what got Rind, Tromovitch and Bauserman in 
such trouble—specifically, “adult-child sex.”  This idea, published, set off an 
anxious “danger signal” to the cultural ego.  Repression was attempted, but since 
the ideas were already published, the best Congress could do was implement a 
neurotic containment strategy:  the House Resolution “rejecting the conclusions” of 
the study. 
I would suggest that similar processes of disavowal and neurosis are central to 
cases like Whorley.  Although much of the discussion in Whorley is about the 
freedom of expression, this discussion is subsumed under an anxious discussion of 
the pedophile or “predator.”  Whorley is arguably more about handling the 
“predator” than it is about the First Amendment or any civil liberties—and yet, as 
Judge Gregory vigorously argues, the case has effects on those liberties.49  What is 
perhaps most striking about Whorley is not how the majority deals with the first 
amendment issues at stake, but rather how those issues are evaded. 
 
Catch a Predator” a “disavowal,” she invokes much more than simply a “rejection” or “hatred.”  She 
also invokes a psychologically complex phenomenon that involves the processes of the unconscious 
itself. 
 46. Steven Angelides, Historicizing Affect, Psychoanalyzing History:  Pedophilia and the 
Discourse of Child Sexuality, 46 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 79, 87 (2003). 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 88.  Angelides goes on to argue that it is childhood sexual conflict, which is central to 
classical psychoanalysis, that forms the basis of this neurosis.  See generally id. 
 49. Whorley IV, 569 F.3d 211, 214 (4th Cir. 2009) (Gregory, J., dissenting from the denial of 
rehearing en banc) (“The Supreme Court’s obscenity jurisprudence has never come close to stripping 
adults of First Amendment protections for their purely private fantasies, and the implications of our 
sanctioning this kind of governmental intrusion into individual freedom of thought are incredibly 
worrisome.  This is an important and difficult case . . . .”); Whorley III, 550 F.3d 326, 353 (4th Cir. 
2008) (Gregory, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Today, under the guise of suppressing 
obscenity . . . we have provided the government with the power to roll back our previously inviolable 
right to use our imaginations to create fantasies.”). 
KIM-BUTLER Corrections.docx 5/13/2011  3:47 PM 
2011] FICTION, CULTURE AND PEDOPHILIA 553 
 
An answer to how this evasion occurs must examine the “cultural unconscious” 
of the narratives the courts present.  Legal scholar Larry Catá Backer comments on 
the role of courts in society:  “Judging is a process of narrative transmogrification: 
Courts hear the stories of litigants and transform them into something digestible.  
Courts accomplish this transformation by retelling stories to express conformity 
with what our society believes and what society ‘knows.’”50  Backer notes that 
“[t]he process of narrative transformation is subconscious.”51  This subconscious 
nature of judicial narrative-making may have much to do with sexuality’s 
functioning “at the level of the unconscious,” as psychoanalytic literary critic 
Jacqueline Rose has argued.52  Just as “the story of the murders of Ronald Goldman 
and Nicole Brown Simpson teaches us far more about the relationships among 
races, the social code of violence between the sexes and perhaps even the power of 
juries than they might teach us about the jurisprudence of murder,” Whorley 
teaches us more about the narratives of childhood and pedophilia in our culture 
than it does about its ostensible subject, the First Amendment.53 
Part I of this Note explains the legal framework that gave rise to Whorley by 
examining the expansion of obscenity law into child pornography law, and by 
closely examining the majority opinion in Whorley.54  In Part II, this Note discusses 
the issue of punishment in Whorley, considering the dissent’s claim that the holding 
in Whorley criminalizes thoughts, violating the First Amendment.  This Note also 
examines the punishment or casting out of the “predator” by reading Whorley 
alongside Doe v. City of Lafayette, Indiana, a Seventh Circuit case that also 
arguably criminalizes thoughts in the service of protecting children.55  Finally, Part 
III considers Whorley more generally in the context of the chilling effects it may 
have on artistic expression that legitimately challenges how we think about children 
and sex. 
I.  BACKGROUND:  THE FIRST AMENDMENT CLAIM, THE INTERNET 
AND CHILD PORNOGRAPHY 
In the 1990s, “obscenity law seemed to be in its death throes, a doctrine largely 
abandoned by prosecutors.”56  How did we get from there to Judge Gregory’s 2008 
dissenting opinion in Whorley stating that “[t]oday, under the guise of suppressing 
obscenity . . . we have provided the government with the power to roll back our 
 
 50. Larry Catá Backer, Tweaking Facts, Speaking Judgment:  Judicial Transmogrification of 
Case Narrative as Jurisprudence in the United States and Britain, 6 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 611, 611 
(1998). 
 51. Id. at 611 (emphasis added). 
 52. JACQUELINE ROSE, PETER PAN, OR THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF CHILDREN’S FICTION 4 (1992). 
 53. Backer, supra note 50, at 614. 
 54. Whorley III, 550 F.3d at 330–43 (majority opinion). 
 55. Whorley IV, 569 F.3d 211 (4th Cir. 2009); Whorley III, 550 F.3d at 326; Doe v. City of 
Lafayette, 377 F.3d 757 (7th Cir. 2004) (en banc). 
 56. Amy Adler, All Porn All the Time, 31 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 695, 697 (2007) 
[hereinafter Adler, All Porn]. 
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previously inviolable right to use our imaginations to create fantasies”?57  This Part 
examines Whorley in the context of child pornography and obscenity law, arguing 
that the upholding of many of Whorley’s convictions is complicit with a 
congressional strategy that substitutes obscenity law for child pornography law to 
criminalize speech without showing harm.  The argument begins with an outline of 
Whorley’s Supreme Court predecessors in child pornography and obscenity law, 
and proceeds with a discussion of some jurisprudential issues raised by these cases.  
This Part then discusses the PROTECT Act of 2003, a direct congressional 
response to the Supreme Court’s 2002 ruling in Ashcroft v. Free Speech 
Coalition.58  Finally, this Part outlines the portion of Judge Niemeyer’s majority 
opinion in Whorley that dismisses every first amendment issue that Whorley 
raises.59 
A.  OBSCENITY AND CHILD PORNOGRAPHY IN SUPREME COURT FIRST 
AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE:  DOCTRINE AND PRINCIPLES 
1.  Child Pornography and Obscenity Law Doctrine 
a. Miller and the Ferber Exception 
Endeavoring to “formulate standards more concrete than those in the past,” 
referring to a “somewhat tortured history,” the Supreme Court in 1973 in Miller v. 
California began with the “categorical[]” agreement that “obscene material is 
unprotected by the First Amendment.”60  That “tortured history” included Roth v. 
United States, the first case in which the Court enunciated that “implicit in the 
history of the First Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as utterly without 
redeeming social importance.”61  In A Book Named “John Cleland’s Memoirs of a 
Woman of Pleasure” v. Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 
a divided Court produced a test for what constitutes the “obscenity” that can 
constitutionally be proscribed.62  The test included the requirement that “the 
material [be] utterly without redeeming social value,” a requirement that the Miller 
court called “virtually impossible to discharge.”63  The Miller court cobbled 
 
 57. Whorley III, 550 F.3d at 353 (Gregory, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 58. Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today 
(PROTECT) Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 18, 21 and 42 U.S.C. (2006)); Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234 (2002). 
 59. Whorley III, 550 F.3d at 330–43 (majority opinion). 
 60. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 20, 23 (1973). 
 61. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).  The Court noted the “universal judgment 
that obscenity should be restrained,” citing international, state and federal laws.  Id. at 485.  The Court 
held unequivocally that “obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press.”  
Id. 
 62. A Book Named “John Cleland’s Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure” v. Att’y Gen. of Mass., 
383 U.S. 413, 418 (1966). 
 63. Miller, 413 U.S. at 22; A Book Named “John Cleland’s Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure,” 
383 U.S. at 418. 
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together a three-part test from previous decisions, a test that remains the standard 
for obscenity to this day:  1) “whether the average person, applying contemporary 
community standards would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the 
prurient interest”; 2) “whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive 
way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law”; and 3) 
“whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or 
scientific value.”64 
All pornography was governed by the Miller test until the 1982 case, New York 
v. Ferber, in which the Supreme Court remarkably recognized child pornography 
as a new form of speech categorically unprotected by the First Amendment.65  The 
defendant in Ferber, the owner of a bookstore “specializing in sexually oriented 
products” sold two films “devoted almost exclusively to depicting young boys 
masturbating.”66  The Court noted that laws criminalizing the distribution of child 
pornography could end up encroaching on protected expression “by allowing the 
hand of the censor to become unduly heavy,” but the Court decided that the states 
were entitled to greater deference in regulating child pornography.67  The Court 
identified five reasons:  1) “[t]he prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse of 
children constitutes a government objective of surpassing importance”; 2)  the 
dissemination of photographs and films of sexual activity by children “is 
intrinsically related to the sexual abuse of children,” in that “the materials produced 
are a permanent record of the children’s participation and the harm to the child is 
exacerbated by their circulation” and “the distribution network for child 
pornography must be closed . . . [to] effectively control[]” it; 3)  the commercial 
selling and advertising of child pornography “provide an economic motive for and 
are thus an integral part of the production of such materials”; 4)  “[t]he value of 
permitting live performances and photographic reproductions of children engaged 
in lewd sexual conduct is exceedingly modest, if not de minimis”; and 5)  holding 
child pornography outside of first amendment protection “is not . . . incompatible” 
with the earlier precedents.68  The Court also expressed the opinion that whether or 
not pornographic films and photographs of children satisfied the Miller test was 
irrelevant, as whether or not a piece of child pornography appealed to the “prurient 
interest” (first prong), whether or not it was “patently offensive” (second prong) 
and whether or not it had “serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value” 
(third prong) did not affect the basic fact that “child[ren] ha[d] been physically or 
psychologically harmed in the production of the work.”69  Obscenity and child 
pornography law are thus closely related but distinct.70 
 
 64. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). 
 65. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 774 (1982). 
 66. Id. at 751–52. 
 67. Id. at 756. 
 68. Id. at 756–64. 
 69. Id. at 760–61. 
 70. See Gabrielle Russell, Comment, Pedophiles in Wonderland:  Censoring the Sinful in 
Cyberspace, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1467, 1477 (2008) (“Although child pornography law grew 
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b.  Expanding the Exception:  Oakes and Osborne 
The Ferber Court arguably begged the question of what “child pornography” 
really is, what kinds of representations constitute child pornography and which of 
these can be proscribed without running afoul of the First Amendment.  The Court 
has doctrinally moved in the direction of expanding both what constitutes child 
pornography and when it can be proscribed.71  In Massachusetts v. Oakes, a 1989 
case, the state statute in question criminalized the act of a person 
[with] reason to know that [a] person is a child under eighteen years of age [who] 
hires, coerces, solicits or entices, employs, procures, uses, causes, encourages, or 
knowingly permits such child to pose or be exhibited in a state of nudity or to 
participate or engage in any live performance or in any act that depicts, describes or 
represents sexual conduct for purpose of visual representation or reproduction . . . .72 
The Court declined to consider the overbreadth challenge the defendant raised.73  
What is more, two concurring Justices, on the authority of Ferber, indicated that it 
would be constitutionally permissible for a state to proscribe all representation of 
childhood nudity so long as the statutes carved out exceptions for certain valid 
“purposes.”74 
The next year, in Osborne v. Ohio, the Court held that mere possession and 
viewing (as opposed to advertising, distribution and sale, as in Ferber) of child 
pornography could be proscribed.75  Although Stanley v. Georgia had clearly stated 
two decades before that “the First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit making 
mere private possession of obscene material a crime,”76 the Court in Osborne 
 
out of obscenity precedents, the two areas of law are distinct.”). 
 71. See Adler, Perverse, supra note 17, at 238–39 (“Each subtle reiteration of the definition of 
‘lascivious exhibition of the genitals’ since Ferber has expanded it.”). 
 72. Massachusetts v. Oakes, 491 U.S. 576, 579 (1989) (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 
29A (1986)). 
 73. Id. at 583–84. 
 74. Id. at 588–90 (Scalia and Blackmun, JJ., concurring).  Such “purposes” included “artistic 
purposes” and “family photographs.”  Id. at 589. 
 75. Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 111 (1990). 
 76. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969).  Even though Stanley held that the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments did not allow the criminalization of obscene materials inside the home, as the 
Court later noted, “Stanley depended, not on any First Amendment right to purchase or possess obscene 
materials, but on the right to privacy in the home,” further emphasizing the reasoning of the “[t]hree 
concurring Justices [who] indicated that [Stanley] could have been disposed of on Fourth Amendment 
grounds without reference to the nature of the materials.”  United States v. 12 200-Foot Reels of Super 
8mm. Film, 413 U.S. 123, 126 (1973) (emphasis added).  The same day 12 200-Foot Reels was decided, 
the Court held that the constitutionally protected “zone of privacy” for obscene materials did not extend 
beyond the home.  United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139, 141–43 (1973).  Orito and 12 200-Foot Reels 
were both five to four decisions, however, and Justices Douglas and Brennan wrote dissents in each, 
which could theoretically be cited for support in child pornography and obscenity cases.  Justice 
Douglas began in 12 200-Foot Reels, “I know of no constitutional way by which a book, tract, paper, 
postcard, or film may be made contraband because of its contents.  The Constitution never purported to 
give the Federal Government censorship or oversight over literary or artistic productions . . . .”  12 200-
Foot Reels, 413 U.S. at 130–31 (Douglas, J., dissenting).  Justice Douglas had always held that 
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reasoned that child pornography could be distinguished from obscene materials 
depicting adults, because of the state’s “compelling interests in protecting the 
physical and psychological well-being of minors and in destroying the market for 
the exploitative use of children by penalizing those who possess and view the 
offending materials,” citing Ferber.77  Osborne’s holding is particularly notable 
considering that this “destroying the market” rationale is not accepted in any 
context other than child pornography. 
One example comparable to, but treated entirely differently from, child 
pornography is the depiction of animal cruelty ending in death to the animals 
depicted.  In the 2010 decision United States v. Stevens, the Supreme Court 
declined to extend the Ferber “destroying the market” rationale for upholding child 
pornography statutes to a federal anti-animal-cruelty-video law.78  The law at issue 
in Stevens criminalized depictions such as dog fighting tapes and “crush videos” in 
which small animals are trampled and crushed to death on tape for the sexual 
gratification of the viewer.79  The Court in Stevens ruled that the federal 
criminalization of these videos was overbroad and in violation of the First 
Amendment.80  Justice Alito, the sole dissenter, argued that the “destroying the 
market” rationale of Ferber was in fact applicable to depictions of animal cruelty.81  
However, he made a point of noting that “the abuse of children is certainly much 
more important than preventing the torture of the animals used in crush videos.”82  
Protecting children from being depicted sexually clearly holds a special place in 
first amendment jurisprudence, justifying intrusions far beyond those that are 
accepted in other contexts. 
 
excluding obscenity from the First Amendment’s protection violated the Constitution.  See Paris Adult 
Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 114 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting).  Justice Brennan had come to the 
same point.  By the time of the 1973 Miller, Paris Adult Theatre I, 12 200-Foot Reels and Orito 
decisions, Justice Brennan believed that the modern architecture of obscenity law, begun by the decision 
he himself had written in Roth, should be abandoned.  See id. at 73 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  Justice 
Brennan argued: 
If, as the Court today assumes, a state legislature may act on the assumption that commerce in 
obscene books, or public exhibitions focused on obscene conduct, have a tendency to exert a 
corrupting and debasing impact leading to antisocial behavior, then it is hard to see how state-
ordered regimentation of our minds can ever be forestalled.  For if a State, in an effort to 
maintain or create a particular moral tone, may prescribe what its citizens cannot read or cannot 
see, then it would seem to follow that in pursuit of that same objective a State could decree that 
its citizens must read certain books or must view certain films.  However laudable its goal . . . the 
State cannot proceed by means that violate the Constitution. 
Id. at 110 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(internal ellipses omitted).  See also generally W. WAT HOPKINS, MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN AND FREEDOM 
OF EXPRESSION (1991).  Obviously, the views of Justices Douglas, Brennan, Stewart and Marshall were 
edged out.  If they had not been, as arguably they should not have been, it seems reasonable to speculate 
that modern obscenity law and child pornography law could be drastically different. 
 77. Osborne, 495 U.S. at 103. 
 78. United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1586 (2010). 
 79. Id. at 1583. 
 80. Id. at 1592. 
 81. Id. at 1599–1600 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 82. Id. at 1600. 
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c.  The Internet and Virtual Child Pornography:  Free Speech Coalition 
While these cases developed in the Supreme Court, Congress was responding to 
the threat of child pornography with federal legislation.83  In 1988, Congress 
responded to what it saw as the danger of the Internet in the proliferation of child 
pornography, and passed the Child Protection and Obscenity Enforcement Act.84  
The Act added the phrase “by any means including by computer” into 18 U.S.C. § 
2251, a federal statute concerning “sexual exploitation of children.”85 
As technology and the Internet became more advanced, pedophiles and 
pornographers catering to them began to produce pornographic material using more 
advanced technologies than those available in the 1970s and ’80s, when obscenity 
and child pornography laws were first adjudicated.86  Photographs of adults could 
be “morphed” or otherwise digitally modified to make them appear like children.87  
Congress passed the Child Pornography Prevention Act (“CPPA”) in 1996, banning 
any depiction that “is, or appears to be, of a minor engaging in sexually explicit 
conduct,” or “conveys the impression that the material is or contains a visual 
depiction of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct.”88  The court of appeals 
circuits split on the constitutionality of the CPPA:  the Ninth Circuit found the Act 
invalid on its face, but the First, Fourth, Fifth and Eleventh Circuits upheld its 
constitutionality.89  In the 2002 case Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, the 
 
 83. Shortly after Ferber, Congress passed the Child Protection Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-292, 
98 Stat. 204 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251–55 (2006)). 
 84. The Child Protection and Obscenity Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, Title 
VII, Subtitle N, 102 Stat. 4181, 4485–4503 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2251 (2006)). 
 85. Id. at 4485. 
 86. See Russell, supra note 70, at 1481. 
 87. See id. at 1481 n.89 (describing “morphing” as “modifying an image or combining two 
images into one.  For example, the features and genitalia of an adult can be adjusted digitally to appear 
more childlike, or a child’s face can be copied from one photo and pasted onto the nude body of an adult 
in another.”). 
 88. Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 121, 110 Stat. 3009, 3028 
(emphasis added), invalidated by Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 258 (2002) (current 
version at 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(B) (2006)); 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(D) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 89. See Free Speech Coal. v. Reno, 198 F.3d 1083, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding the language 
“appears to be a minor” and “conveys the impression” unconstitutionally vague and overbroad); United 
States v. Hilton, 167 F.3d 61, 76–77 (1st Cir. 1999) (“Hilton’s vagueness challenge fails [because] there 
are few equally efficacious alternatives. . . .  We see no reason to strike down the CPPA as 
unconstitutionally vague.  The language of the statute affords an ordinary consumer of sexually explicit 
material adequate notice of the kinds of images to avoid.”), overruled by Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 258; 
United States v. Mento, 231 F.3d 912, 921–22 (4th Cir. 2000) (stating that “[w]e agree with the First 
Circuit that the statutory language ‘appears to be’ cannot be improved upon while still achieving the 
compelling government purpose of banning child pornography” and holding the CPPA not 
unconstitutionally overbroad or vague), overruled by Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 258; United States v. Fox, 
248 F.3d 394, 405, 407 (5th Cir. 2001) (finding that Balthus paintings or stills from film version of 
Lolita would not be sufficiently threatened by the CPPA in light of the constitutional avoidance doctrine 
and holding that the statute’s scienter requirement and affirmative defenses are constitutionally adequate 
protection against improper prosecution), overruled by Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 258; United States v. 
Acheson, 195 F.3d 645, 652–53 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding the CPPA not overbroad or unconstitutionally 
vague), overruled by Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 258. 
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Supreme Court struck down two provisions of the CPPA as overbroad in violation 
of the First Amendment.90  This was the first (and so far, only) time the Court 
invalidated child pornography legislation on overbreadth grounds.91  In fact, in the 
line of child pornography cases starting with Ferber, Ashcroft was the first decision 
in which a majority on the Court sent a clear message that some legislation 
prohibiting certain kinds of child pornography would run afoul of the First 
Amendment’s guarantee that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the 
freedom of speech.”92 
2.  Broader First Amendment Theory and Child Pornography Law’s Effects 
With regard to the intersection of children and sexuality, we may be in what 
legal scholar Vincent Blasi calls a “pathological period,” a historical period in 
which “certain dynamics . . . radically increase the likelihood that people who hold 
unorthodox views will be punished for what they say or believe.”93  In his view, the 
First Amendment ought to provide its most robust protection “in those historical 
periods when intolerance of unorthodox ideas is most prevalent and when 
governments are most able and most likely to stifle dissent systematically.”94  
 
 90. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 256, 258.  The Court writes: 
[Section] 2256(8)(B) covers materials beyond the categories recognized in Ferber and Miller, 
and the reasons the Government offers in support of limiting the freedom of speech have no 
justification in our precedents or in the law of the First Amendment.  The provision abridges the 
freedom to engage in a substantial amount of lawful speech.  For this reason, it is overbroad and 
unconstitutional. . . .  § 2256(8)(D) . . . prohibits a substantial amount of speech that falls outside 
Ginzburg’s rationale. . . . the CPPA does more than prohibit pandering.  It prohibits possession 
of material described, or pandered, as child pornography by someone earlier in the distribution 
chain. . . .  The First Amendment requires a more precise restriction.  For this reason, § 
2256(8)(D) is substantially overbroad and in violation of the First Amendment. 
Id.  (citing Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966)). 
 91. See Adler, Inverting, supra note 22, at 962 (noting, in 2001, that “[s]o far, the Supreme Court 
has rejected all ‘overbreadth’ challenges to child pornography laws”). 
 92. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 244 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. I). 
 93. Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 
449, 450 (1985). 
 94. Id. at 449–50.  In case one would wonder, the point here is not to present pedophilia or child 
sexual abuse as merely reflecting “unorthodox ideas” or “stifled” sexual preferences.  But the doctrine 
already presented has shown that, at least for a majority of the Supreme Court, there is a difference 
between the child pornography regulated in Ferber, in which the Court found that actual children were 
harmed in the production of the pornography, and the virtual child pornography in Ashcroft, which “is 
not ‘intrinsically related’ to the sexual abuse of children.”  Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 250 (quoting New York 
v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 759 (1982)).  Also, the psychological literature notes that “‘[p]edophilia’ is not 
synonymous with ‘sexual offending against children.’”  Seto, supra note 37, at 164; see also supra note 
37 (discussing what “pedophilia” is according to varying perspectives).  The notorious organization the 
North American Man/Boy Love Association (“NAMBLA”) does indeed see “men and boys in mutually 
consensual relationships” as an “extreme[ly] oppress[ed]” sexuality.  See Who We Are, NAMBLA, 
http:://www.nambla.org/welcome.htm (last visited Feb. 2, 2011).  The point here is not to support 
NAMBLA’s view or to say that gay pederastic relations should be tolerated or legalized.  (NAMBLA 
seems to assume that issues of whether children can properly give meaningful consent are unimportant 
or uncontroversial, saying “NAMBLA is strongly opposed to age-of-consent laws and all other 
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Examples of such periods are the times that produced the Alien and Sedition Acts, 
the Red Scare and McCarthyism, “lapses in toleration of dissent” that “have 
acquired an aura of ignominy that says much about the importance of free speech in 
the pantheon of national ideals.”95 
Professor Adler argues that there has been a recent historical and cultural 
construction of panic over child sexual abuse and child pornography, and that as a 
result “[w]e are so horrified . . . that, to combat it, we have inverted the First 
Amendment.”96  The distinction between speech and conduct is a core element of 
first amendment jurisprudence:  a depiction of an act is different from the act 
itself.97  The former may not be proscribed; the latter may be.98  This distinction 
took time in first amendment jurisprudence to build.99  Thinking of speech and 
what it represents as equivalent is “an ancient instinct” which the Court once 
“succumbed to” in subversive political advocacy cases, but later rejected.100  “By 
insisting on the division between speech and what it represents or causes, modern 
first amendment law marked a triumph of rationality over religious, magical, or 
superstitious views of speech,” Adler writes.101  But in child pornography law, 
from Ferber to now, that “ancient” equivalence has reasserted itself.  In the context 
of child pornography, the Court holds that the depiction of a crime can be 
proscribed without violating the First Amendment; in doing so, it inverts the 
distinction between speech and action that is at the core of the First Amendment. 
Child pornography is the only place in first amendment law where it is 
constitutional to “criminalize the depiction of a crime.”102  Criminalizing the 
depiction of a crime was, in Ferber, justified by the idea that criminalizing the 
depiction was the only way to stamp out the underlying harm (the harm done to the 
children used in the production of pornography and the continued harm done by its 
circulation).103  But Ferber was not entirely uncontroversial, even when it was 
decided.104  It was signed by a unanimous Court, but three concurring opinions 
 
restrictions which deny men and boys the full enjoyment of their bodies and control over their own 
lives.”  Id.)  The point, rather, is to understand how views such as NAMBLA’s operate as a limit to 
social acceptability, and a limit to the kinds of expression that the First Amendment will protect.  The 
point is to consider what those limits might mean and what the implications are.  The response of “Oh, 
so you think pedophilia, coercion, assault and rape are just ‘unorthodox ideas’ that are unfairly ‘put 
down’ by society and law?  Do you know what pedophiles do to children?” operates as a silencing 
technique that seeks to foreclose any critical thinking about these issues. 
 95. Blasi, supra note 93, at 456. 
 96. Adler, Inverting, supra note 22, at 926 (emphasis added). 
 97. Id. at 972–73. 
 98. Id. 
 99. See id. at 1002. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 984. 
 103. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 759 (1982) (“[T]he distribution network for child 
pornography must be closed if the production of material which requires the sexual exploitation of 
children is to be effectively controlled.”). 
 104. Sandra Zunker Brown argued in 1982 that Ferber was “insufficiently protective of first 
amendment freedoms, unnecessary to protect children, and unsound,” calling its departure from the 
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raised questions beyond those contemplated by the Court.105  Also, a commentator 
noted, “An absolute categorical exclusion such as that created in Ferber has never 
before been permitted, and for excellent reasons.”106 
Whether or not the initial move to allow criminalization of the depiction of a 
crime is justified in the case of child pornography, child pornography law has 
moved far beyond that point.107  In Osborne, a new rationale for allowing the 
 
Miller standard of obscenity “ominous” and expressing the hope that prosecutors would retreat from the 
“extraordinarily broad exclusion” of Ferber.  Sandra Zunker Brown, Note, First Amendment—
Nonobscene Child Pornography and Its Categorical Exclusion from Constitutional Protection, 73 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1337, 1362–64 (1982). 
 105. See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 774–75 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  Justice O’Connor writes: 
[T]he Court does not hold that New York must except material with serious literary, scientific, or 
educational value, from its statute.  The Court merely holds that, even if the First Amendment 
shelters such material, New York’s current statute is not sufficiently overbroad to support 
respondent’s facial attack.  The compelling interests identified in today’s opinion . . . suggest that 
the Constitution might in fact permit New York to ban knowing distribution of works depicting 
minors engaged in explicit sexual conduct, regardless of the social value of the depictions. . . .  
On the other hand, it is quite possible that New York’s statute is overbroad because it bans 
depictions that do not actually threaten the harms identified by the Court. 
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  Justice Brennan writes: 
[A]pplication of [the New York statute] or any similar statute to depictions of children that in 
themselves do have serious literary, artistic, scientific, or medical value, would violate the First 
Amendment. . . .  I . . . adhere to my view that, in the absence of exposure, or particular harm, to 
juveniles or unconsenting adults, the State lacks power to suppress sexually oriented materials. 
Id. at 775–77 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citing Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 73 (1973) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting)) (emphasis added).  Justice Stevens writes: 
[T]he specific conduct that gave rise to this criminal prosecution is not protected by the Federal 
Constitution [but] the state statute that respondent violated prohibits some conduct that is 
protected by the First Amendment.  The critical question, then, is whether this respondent, to 
whom the statute may be applied without violating the Constitution, may challenge the statute on 
the ground that it conceivably may be applied unconstitutionally to others in situations not before 
the Court.  I agree with the Court’s answer to this question but not with its method of analyzing 
the issue. 
Id. at 777–81 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (emphasis added). 
 106. Brown, supra note 104, at 1364.  Brown elaborates on the reasons that a categorical exclusion 
such as Ferber’s is inappropriate: 
If this nation is seriously committed to preserving first amendment freedoms, it must allow no 
departure from the long-standing principle that ‘in the area of freedom of speech and press the 
courts must always remain sensitive to any infringement on genuinely serious literary, artistic, 
political, or scientific expression.’  In order to detect such infringements, the Court must use 
sensitive tools. . . . [A]n absolute categorization is not a sensitive tool; it is a blunt instrument.  It 
renders the Court blind to any serious value which a work might contain. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 107. There is reason to believe that Ferber’s rationale is at least less problematic for the First 
Amendment than the subsequent cases.  See Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 129, 126 (1990) (Brennan, 
J., dissenting) (distinguishing the legitimate statute in Ferber, which was not overbroad, because “only 
‘a tiny fraction of materials within the statute’s reach’ was constitutionally protected” from the 
regulation in Osborne, which is “plainly overbroad” (quoting Ferber, 458 U.S. at 773)); Adler, 
Inverting, supra note 22, at 987–88 (recognizing that “there are other bases on which to defend Ferber 
[such as] that the conflation of image and act may be justified because of the special circumstances 
surrounding child pornography” while questioning these bases by asking whether it is “correct to say 
that child pornography ‘is’ child abuse and to treat it accordingly?”). 
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criminalization of possession of child pornography emerged:  “evidence suggests 
that pedophiles use child pornography to seduce other children into sexual 
activity.”108  This is the only time in history that the Court upheld a restriction on 
speech “because of the possibility that someone might use it for nefarious 
purposes.”109  Justice Brandeis had, after all, stated unequivocally, “[f]ear of 
serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of free speech . . . .  Men feared 
witches and burnt women. . . .  There must be reasonable ground to believe that the 
danger apprehended is imminent.”110  In Stanley (distinguished in Osborne), the 
Court said “the State may no more prohibit mere possession of obscene matter on 
the ground that it may lead to antisocial conduct than it may prohibit possession of 
chemistry books on the ground that they may lead to the manufacture of homemade 
spirits.”111  When the issue is child pornography, however, the Court is willing to 
allow the criminalization of speech for a reason accepted nowhere else in first 
amendment law:  that pedophiles might “use” child pornography to “seduce other 
children.”112 
Why did a majority of the Court in Osborne strive to distinguish the holding in 
Stanley?  Perhaps it has more to do with the “sin” or “immorality” of child 
pornography rather than “destroying the market” or the fact that pedophiles might 
“use” the child pornography to “seduce” children.113  Legal scholar Louis Henkin 
argued in 1963 that morality and the concept of sin are central to obscenity law, 
that obscenity laws “are based on traditional notions, rooted in this country’s 
religious antecedents, of governmental responsibility for communal and individual 
‘decency’ and ‘morality.’”114  Henkin argued that “obscenity laws are not 
principally motivated by any conviction that obscene materials inspire sexual 
offenses.”115  In other words, obscenity is used primarily to punish and deter “sin,” 
not to prevent harm.  But the entire line of child pornography cases is predicated 
upon the prevention of harm to children.116  The child pornography cases may be 
explained better by the Court’s wish to punish and deter moral corruption, not by 
its stated objective of protecting children. 
B.  THE PROTECT ACT AND THE EMERGENCE OF OBSCENITY LAW AS A WAY 
 
 108. Osborne, 495 U.S. at 111 (emphasis added). 
 109. Adler, Inverting, supra note 22, at 993 (“Until Osborne, it was unheard of in modern First 
Amendment law that speech could be banned because of the possibility that someone might use it for 
nefarious purposes.”). 
 110. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (emphasis added), 
overruled in part by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969); see also Adler, Inverting, supra 
note 22, at 994 (calling Justice Brandeis’s declaration “a basic free speech principle”). 
 111. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 567 (1969); see also Adler, Inverting, supra note 22, at 994 
(quoting Stanley, 394 U.S. at 567). 
 112. Osborne, 495 U.S. at 111. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Louis Henkin, Morals and the Constitution:  The Sin of Obscenity, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 391, 
391 (1963). 
 115. Id. at 391. 
 116. See supra notes 67–69 and accompanying text. 
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TO CRIMINALIZE CHILD PORNOGRAPHY 
The Court in Ashcroft takes pains to make a strong statement in favor of 
protecting free speech from congressional overreach.  The Court wrote: 
Congress may pass valid laws to protect children from abuse, and it has.  The prospect 
of crime, however, by itself does not justify laws suppressing protected speech. . . . .  
It is also well established that speech may not be prohibited because it concerns 
subjects offending our sensibilities.117 
Having failed to draft constitutionally sound legislation to deal with the problem 
of “virtual” child pornography, Congress went back to the drawing board, settling 
on the Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children 
Today (“PROTECT”) Act, and passing it in 2003.118  The Act added a new 
obscenity offense to Title 18 of the U.S. Code, § 1466A(a)(1), which subjects to 
criminal prosecution “any person who knowingly produces, distributes, receives, or 
possesses with intent to distribute, a visual depiction of any kind, including a 
drawing, cartoon, sculpture, or painting that . . . depicts a minor engaging in 
sexually explicit conduct; and . . . is obscene.”119  Obscene materials have long 
been unprotected by the First Amendment.120  However, obscenity prosecutions 
were almost nonexistent by the 1990s; it was a doctrine “in its death throes.”121  It 
was time to revive obscenity, Congress seemed to declare, this time as a tool to get 
around the Court’s holding in Ashcroft. 
The Senate Report on the PROTECT Act claimed that its purpose was to undo 
the 
great[] impair[ment of] the government’s ability to bring successful child pornography 
prosecutions. . . .  Since the ruling in [Ashcroft], defendants in child pornography 
cases have consistently claimed that the images in question could be virtual.  By 
raising this ‘virtual porn defense,’ the government has been required to find proof that 
the child is real in nearly every child pornography prosecution.122 
 
 117. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 245 (2002), (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2251 
(2000)); see also Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 874 (1997) (“In evaluating the free 
speech rights of adults, we have made it perfectly clear that ‘[s]exual expression which is indecent but 
not obscene is protected by the First Amendment.’” (quoting Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 
U.S. 115, 126 (1989))); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745 (1978) (“[T]he fact that society may 
find speech offensive is not a sufficient reason for suppressing it.”); Kingsley Int’l Pictures Corp. v. 
Regents of Univ. of N.Y., 360 U.S. 684, 689 (1959)  (“Among free men, the deterrents ordinarily to be 
applied to prevent crime are education and punishment for violations of the law, not abridgment of the 
rights of free speech . . . .” (quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 378 (1927))). 
 118. Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today 
(PROTECT) Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 18, 21, and 42 U.S.C. (2006)). 
 119. 18 U.S.C. § 1466A(a)(1). 
 120. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 20 (1973); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 
(1957). 
 121. Adler, All Porn, supra note 56, at 697. 
 122. S. REP. NO. 108-2, at 4 (2003).  Justice Souter notes in his dissenting opinion in the 2008 case 
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Curiously, the Senate Report does not provide similar justification for the new 
obscenity offense; it simply explains what the offense entails: 
It prohibits any obscene depictions of minors engaged in any form of sexually explicit 
conduct.  It further prohibits a narrow category of ‘hardcore’ pornography involving 
real or apparent minors, where such depictions lack literary, artistic, political or 
scientific value.  This new offense is subject to the penalties applicable to child 
pornography, not the lower penalties that apply to obscenity, and therefore contains a 
directive to the U.S. Sentencing Commission requiring it to ensure that the U.S. 
Sentencing Guidelines are consistent with this fact.123 
Unlike the Ferber definition of child pornography as “intrinsically harmful” to 
the minors involved in its production, the Miller standard of “obscenity” needs no 
“victims” and is so general as to encompass “patently offensive” exhibitions of 
“sexual conduct” appealing to the “prurient interest.”124 
In this way, Congress used obscenity law to get around the obstacle of Ashcroft.  
This strategy has affinities with those of organizations such as the National Center 
for Missing and Exploited Children, whose representative told PROTECT Act 
sponsor Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT): 
the vast majority (99–100%) of all child pornography would be found to be obscene 
by most judges and juries, even under the standard of beyond a reasonable doubt in 
criminal cases.  Even within the reasonable person under community standards model, 
it is highly unlikely that any community would not find child pornography 
obscene.125 
Obscenity law was therefore an attractive avenue allowing Congress to 
circumvent Ashcroft.126  As one commentator notes, this revision of existing 
obscenity law “has basically reinstated the ban on virtual child pornography struck 
down [in Ashcroft] but has refashioned it as an obscenity law to avoid having to 
 
United States v. Williams that this basis is questionable.  He wrote, “Although Congress found that child 
pornography defendants ‘almost universally rais[e]’ the defense that the alleged child pornography could 
be simulated or virtual, neither Congress nor this Court has been given the citation to a single case in 
which a defendant’s acquittal is reasonably attributable to that defense.”  United States v. Williams, 553 
U.S. 285, 323–34 (2008) (Souter, J., dissenting) (brackets in original). 
 123. S. REP. NO. 108-2, at 13. 
 124. See Miller, 413 U.S. at 24. 
 125. Letter from Daniel Armagh, Nat’l Ctr. for Missing & Exploited Children, to Senator Patrick J. 
Leahy (Oct. 17, 2002), in 149 CONG. REC. S2582–83 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 2003) [hereinafter Letter from 
Daniel Armagh]; see James Nicholas Kornegay, Note, Protecting Our Children and the Constitution:  
An Analysis of the “Virtual” Child Pornography Provisions of the PROTECT Act of 2003, 47 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 2129, 2162 (2006) (“Recognizing that virtual child pornography cannot be 
constitutionally proscribed as pornography, some have argued that the more effective method of dealing 
with such material is to seek its elimination under the umbrella of obscenity regulations.”) (citing Aimee 
G. Hamoy, Comment, The Constitutionality of Virtual Child Pornography:  Why Reality and Fantasy 
Are Still Different Under the First Amendment, 12 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 471, 512 (2002); Ryan P. 
Kennedy, Note, Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition:  Can We Roast the Pig Without Burning Down the 
House in Regulating “Virtual” Child Pornography?, 37 AKRON L. REV. 379, 411 (2004)). 
 126. See Russell, supra note 70, at 1484–85. 
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prove actual harm to minors.”127 
The constitutional deficiency of the PROTECT Act has been noted by at least 
two Justices on the Supreme Court.  In the 2008 case United States v. Williams, a 
majority of the Court upheld 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(3)(B), the “pandering” 
provision of the Act.128  Justice Souter, joined by Justice Ginsburg, dissented from 
the Court’s apparent finding of “justification . . . for making independent crimes of 
proposals to engage in transactions that may include protected materials.”129  
Justice Souter does not think it constitutionally infirm to prohibit pandering or 
presenting prosecutable child pornography, but finds that “maintaining the First 
Amendment protection of expression we have previously held to cover fake child 
pornography requires a limit to the law’s criminalization of pandering 
proposals.”130  Here, Justice Souter objects to the fact that the elements of the 
pandering provision are the same whether the material depicts real children or 
not.131  This is a restriction on speech (by criminal prosecution) that leaves Ferber 
and Ashcroft “as empty as if the Court overruled them formally, and when a case as 
well considered and as recently decided as [Ashcroft] is put aside (after a mere six 
years) there ought to be a very good reason.”132  Justice Souter thus clearly 
recognizes the PROTECT Act’s pandering provision as an “attempt to get around 
our holding[]” in Ashcroft.133  Justice Souter would hold “that a transaction of what 
turns out to be fake pornography is better understood, not as an incomplete attempt 
to commit a crime [as the majority holds], but as a completed series of intended 
acts that simply do not add up to a crime, owing to the privileged character of the 
material the parties were in fact about to deal in.”134 
 
 127. Id. at 1486. 
 128. United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 307 (2008) (holding 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(3)(B) 
constitutional).  The “pandering” statute imposes a five-year mandatory minimum prison sentence and a 
possible twenty-year term for someone who 
knowingly advertises, promotes, presents, [or] distributes . . . any material or purported material 
in a manner that reflects the belief, or that is intended to cause another to believe, that the 
material or purported material is, or contains an obscene [or non-obscene] visual depiction of a 
minor [or an actual minor] engaging in sexually explicit conduct. 
18 U.S.C. § 2252A(b)(1), (a)(3)(B) (2006).  The Court construes the provision to mean that one is 
“promoting child pornography” in violation of the statute if one:  1) “knowingly exhibits ‘speech that 
accompanies or seeks to induce a transfer of child pornography . . . from one person to another’”; 2) 
“holds the subjective belief that the material is child pornography”; 3) “the speech ‘objectively 
manifest[s] a belief that the material is child pornography’”; 4) “the speaker ‘intend[s] that the listener 
believe the material to be child pornography’”; 5) “the speaker ‘select[s] a manner of advertising, 
promoting, presenting, distributing, or soliciting the material that he thinks will engender that belief”; 
and 6) the material depicts sexual activity by actual minors.  This summarization is Megan Stuart’s.  
Megan Stuart, Saying, Wearing, Watching, and Doing:  Equal First Amendment Protection for Coming 
out, Having Sex, and Possessing Child Pornography, 11 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 341, 363–64 (2010). 
 129. Williams, 553 U.S. at 314 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 130. Id. at 311. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 320. 
 133. Id. at 321. 
 134. Id. (emphasis added). 
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Finally, Justice Souter also questions a major basis for the PROTECT Act itself: 
“Although Congress found that child pornography defendants ‘almost universally 
rais[e]’ the defense that the alleged child pornography could be simulated or 
virtual, neither Congress nor this Court has been given the citation to a single case 
in which a defendant’s acquittal is reasonably attributable to that defense.”135  So, 
at least one of the reasons for such “Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools” is at 
least questionable, as is its precedential role in Williams.136 
C.  REITERATING OBSCENITY LAW’S REACH:  MORE FACTS AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES IN THE MAJORITY OPINION IN WHORLEY, INITIAL 
CHALLENGES FROM THE DISSENT AND HANDLEY 
Defendant Dwight Whorley did not sell, produce or pander child pornography or 
obscenity; instead, he principally received the materials at issue over the 
Internet.137  Moreover, he wrote and sent only one of the twenty emails for which 
he is serving time; the rest were written to him by another adult.138  In the Virginia 
Employment Commission’s public resource room, which included a number of 
computers and printers, a woman saw Whorley “viewing what appeared to be child 
pornography” on one of the computers and notified employees, who found 
Japanese anime-style cartoon pictures of children engaged in sexual conduct with 
adults.139  Whorley was escorted away and, finding his email account still open on 
the computer, Commission employees printed emails and several more pictures.140  
The FBI also obtained information from his email account provider.141  He was 
convicted of seventy-four counts, under 18 U.S.C. § 1466A(a)(1) for the anime-
style cartoons (“knowingly receiving . . . obscene visual depictions of minors 
engaging in sexually explicit conduct”), § 1462 for the emails and cartoons 
(“sending or receiving in interstate commerce 20 obscene e-mails”) and § 
2252(a)(2) for the sexually explicit pictures of actual children (“knowingly 
receiving . . . 15 visual depictions of minors engaging in sexually explicit 
conduct”).142 
Judge Niemeyer, writing for the two to one panel majority in Whorley’s Fourth 
 
 135. Id. at 323–24. 
 136. See Stuart, supra note 128, at 364–65.  Stuart writes: 
The Court’s interpretation of the Act is overly broad. . . .  The PROTECT Act criminalizes any 
statement about one’s sexual fantasies or reactions to viewing material (either child pornography 
or not) if the individual communicates the fantasy in such a way that leads the listener to believe 
the speaker has child pornography. 
Id. 
 137. Whorley III, 550 F.3d 326, 338 (4th Cir. 2008). 
 138. Id. at 339–40. 
 139. Id. at 330. 
 140. Id. at 330–31. 
 141. Id. at 331. 
 142. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1466A(a)(1), 2252(a)(2), 1462 (2006); Whorley III, 550 F.3d at 331.  One of the 
counts did not result in a conviction, due to lack of evidence that the person depicted was a minor.  
Whorley III, 550 F.3d at 331. 
KIM-BUTLER Corrections.docx 5/13/2011  3:47 PM 
2011] FICTION, CULTURE AND PEDOPHILIA 567 
 
Circuit panel appeal, is apparently unconcerned by the emphasis placed in Ashcroft 
on the “intrinsic abuse” rationale of Ferber, focusing, as Congress did in enacting 
the PROTECT Act, on “obscenity” involving children.143  Judge Niemeyer’s 
opinion upholds all of Whorley’s convictions, including those involving no real 
children.  Judge Niemeyer characterizes Whorley’s crimes as simply “violat[ing] 
criminal statutes regulating obscenity.”144  By placing the emphasis on obscenity 
rather than child pornography, Judge Niemeyer echoes Congress’s strategy of 
avoidance:  criminalizing virtual child pornography through obscenity law (where 
no harm need be shown), as opposed to earlier legal doctrine applicable to actual 
child pornography under Ferber (where harm is presumed since actual children are 
used in its production). 
Whorley’s first challenge to his convictions is that § 1462 is facially 
unconstitutional because it violates the First Amendment under Stanley v. 
Georgia.145  As discussed above, in Stanley, the Court held that it is a violation of 
the First Amendment to criminalize mere possession and viewing of obscene 
materials in one’s home.146  Judge Niemeyer answers this challenge by asserting 
that there is no corresponding right to receive such materials, and that the “focus of 
the statute’s prohibition is on the movement of obscene matter in interstate 
commerce, not its possession in the home.”147  Since Whorley “received” the 
emails and cartoon pictures through interstate commerce, the convictions must 
stand.  Whorley also argues that § 1462 is impermissibly vague, in the sense that 
the word “receives” is so broad as to criminalize even unwitting receipt of obscene 
materials.148  This argument appears to be mistaken, as Judge Niemeyer observes in 
response that § 1462 criminalizes only “knowing” receipt of such materials.149  In 
Whorley’s case, Judge Niemeyer sees no difficulty in finding the requisite level of 
scienter, as “Whorley actively used a computer to solicit obscene materials through 
numerous and repetitive searches and ultimately succeeded in obtaining the 
materials he sought.”150  These “numerous . . . searches” are those Whorley 
performed on the Commission computer via the YAHOO! search engine, using the 
search string “child sex play.”151  Judge Niemeyer does not address the possibility 
that Whorley’s receipt of the obscene emails through his private email account 
might not have been “knowing.”  It is unclear what level of scienter is required 
under § 1466, and it is a point Judge Niemeyer does not address or consider. 
Whorley also argues that the emails, as pure text, cannot legally be obscene.  In 
 
 143. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 236 (2002); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 
747, 759 (1982). 
 144. Whorley IV, 569 F.3d 211, 211 (4th Cir. 2009) (Niemeyer, J., supporting the denial of 
rehearing en banc). 
 145. Whorley III, 550 F.3d at 332 (addressing this argument). 
 146. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 557 (1969). 
 147. Whorley III, 550 F.3d at 332–33. 
 148. Id. at 333. 
 149. Id. at 334. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. at 331. 
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response, Judge Niemeyer cites Miller and Kaplan v. California, in which the 
Supreme Court stated that obscenity can be in written or oral forms as well as 
pictorial or visual.152  These citations resolve the issue for Judge Niemeyer, but 
Whorley’s claim may not be that simple to discard.  In Miller, the Court made clear 
that “[u]nder [our obscenity]  holdings . . . no one will be subject to prosecution for 
the sale or exposure of obscene materials unless those materials depict or describe 
patently offensive ‘hard core’ sexual conduct specifically defined . . . .”153  It also 
seems that the Miller Court viewed the context of the obscenity it expelled from 
first amendment protection differently from the context we are presented with in 
Whorley. The Court in Miller said: 
We are satisfied that these specific prerequisites will provide fair notice to a dealer in 
such materials that his public and commercial activities may bring prosecution.  If the 
inability to define regulated materials with ultimate, god-like precision altogether 
removes the power of the States or the Congress to regulate, then ‘hard core’ 
pornography may be exposed without limit to the juvenile, the passerby, and the 
consenting adult alike . . . the public portrayal of hard-core sexual conduct for its own 
sake, and for the ensuing commercial gain, is a different matter.154 
The Miller decision raises issues absent from Judge Niemeyer’s short 
consideration of Whorley’s claim.  Are private emails traded between adults 
“public,” “commercial” or related to “commercial gain”?  In what way if so?  Is 
there truly a serious risk of exposure of “hard core pornography” to “the juvenile” 
or “the passerby”?  Also absent from Judge Niemeyer’s rationale is any 
consideration of whether or not the emails and pictures were “hard core,” 
something the Miller Court clearly found relevant if not dispositive.155  The 
majority opinion in Whorley also ignores Judge Gregory’s point, later made in his 
dissent to the denial of rehearing en banc, that there is no case “that, in limiting 
Stanley, deals with circumstances like this where the sending or receiving of the 
obscene materials involves neither a commercial transaction nor any kind of 
victim.”156  Nevertheless, Judge Niemeyer holds that Whorley’s § 1462 arguments 
“are readily rejected.”157 
Finally, Whorley claims that § 1466A(a)(1) is unconstitutional as applied to the 
 
 152. Id. at 335 (quoting Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115, 119 (1973)). 
 153. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 27 (1973). 
 154. Id. at 27–28, 35 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
 155. The term “hard core” is notoriously difficult to define, leading Justice Stewart famously to 
conclude, “perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly [defining “hard core”].  But I know it when I see 
it . . . .”  Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).  Justice Harlan, in the 
earlier Roth case, also took issue with the “hard-core” designation:  “I do not think that the federal 
statute can be constitutionally construed to reach other than what the Government has termed as ‘hard-
core’ pornography.”  Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 507 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring in the 
result in No. 61, and dissenting in No. 582). 
 156. Whorley IV, 569 F.3d 211, 212 (4th Cir. 2009) (Gregory, J., dissenting from the denial of 
rehearing en banc). 
 157. Whorley III, 550 F.3d at 335. 
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cartoon pictures because they are not depictions of actual people.158  If § 
1466A(a)(1) is construed not to require the depiction of actual children in order to 
trigger an obscenity prosecution, then it is unconstitutional on its face under Ferber 
and Ashcroft, Whorley contends.159  Judge Niemeyer responds that § 1466A(a)(1) 
clearly criminalizes receipt of “a visual depiction of any kind, including a drawing, 
cartoon, sculpture, or painting” if it “depicts a minor engaging in sexually explicit 
conduct” and is obscene.160  He also points out that § 1466A(c) clearly says “[i]t is 
not a required element of any offense under this section that the minor depicted 
actually exist.”161  Judge Gregory argues that Judge Niemeyer misreads § 
1466A(c).  He points out first that § 2232 defines minor as “any person under the 
age of eighteen years.”162  And Webster’s dictionary says a “person” is a “living 
human being,” “with legal rights and duties.”163  Clearly, a cartoon person is not 
living, and is not a human being with legal rights and duties.164 
Moreover, as Judge Gregory argues, the relaxing of the requirement that the 
government show “the minor depicted actually exist” is not meant to allow for 
prosecution for sexually explicit pictures of imaginary children, but rather “to 
reliev[e] the Government from the burden of exhaustively searching the country to 
identify conclusively the children involved in the production of the child 
pornography.”165  The Senate Report on the PROTECT Act explained: 
[P]rosecutors typically are unable to identify the children depicted in child 
pornography. . . . [T]hese children are abused and victimized in anonymity, even 
when the child pornography is produced within the United States.  Prosecutions 
therefore rest on the depictions themselves; juries are urged to infer the age and 
existence of the minor from the sexually explicit depiction itself.166 
Congress clearly anticipated actual children involved in child pornography; the 
concern that led to the clause “it is not a required element . . . that the minor 
depicted actually exist” was for children “abused and victimized in anonymity.”167  
So, assuming the child depicted in the picture actually exists, the government need 
not actually find that exact child, identify him or her and conclusively identify his 
or her age to prosecute under § 1466A.  Judge Gregory’s argument points to this 
legislative history to offer a much more plausible argument than Judge Niemeyer 
offers as to the appropriate reading of § 1466A. 
Finally, against Judge Niemeyer’s view that § 1466A(a)(1) includes cartoon 
 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. at 335–36. 
 160. Id. at 336 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1466A(a)(1) (2006)). 
 161. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1466A(c)). 
 162. Id. at 351 (Gregory, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2232) 
(emphasis added). 
 163. Id. (quoting WEBSTER’S II NEW RIVERSIDE UNIVERSITY DICTIONARY 877 (1994)). 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. S. REP. NO. 108-2, at 4 (2003). 
 167. Id. 
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people, Judge Gregory makes a “rule against superfluities” argument.168  In his 
view, reading § 1466A(a)(1) to include cartoon depictions makes subsection (a)(2) 
superfluous.169  He argues that since (a)(1) requires only “sexually explicit 
conduct” while (a)(2) criminalizes a smaller set of conduct (“graphic bestiality, 
sadistic or masochistic abuse, or sexual intercourse”), “the standard under 
subsection (a)(1) is less demanding, presumably because the conduct involves the 
abuse of real minors.”170 
The issue of fictional cartoon children and the PROTECT Act has recently been 
raised elsewhere.  The 2008 district court case United States v. Handley, in the 
Southern District of Iowa (in the Eighth, not the Fourth, Circuit) is very similar to 
Whorley.171  The defendant, Christopher Handley, received drawings from Japanese 
anime comics of “fictional characters” “produced either by hand or by computer,” 
including “drawings and cartoons, that depicted graphic bestiality, including sexual 
intercourse, between human beings and animals such as pigs, monkeys, and 
others.”172  Handley was indicted under § 1466A(a) and § 1466A(b), the new 
obscenity offenses created by the PROTECT Act.173  His indictments were upheld 
by the court.174  But the court holds two subsections of the PROTECT Act, § 
1466A(a)(2) and § 1466A(b)(2), unconstitutional.175 
Handley’s holding highlights another possible problem with the PROTECT Act.  
Looking more closely at § 1466A, we find that § 1466A(a)(1) subjects to criminal 
penalty anyone who “knowingly produces, distributes, receives, or possesses with 
intent to distribute, a visual depiction of any kind . . . that . . . depicts a minor 
engaging in sexually explicit conduct; and is obscene.”176  Section 1466A(b)(1) 
subjects to criminal penalty anyone who “knowingly possesses a visual depiction of 
any kind . . . that . . . depicts a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; and is 
obscene.”177  Both of these sub-subsections require that the depictions be 
“obscene,” and for that reason the district court in Handley upholds the 
constitutionality of both.178  However, § 1466A(a)(2) and §1466A(b)(2) require 
only that the depictions possessed, received, produced, distributed or possessed 
with the intent to distribute be or appear to be “of a minor engaging in graphic 
bestiality, sadistic or masochistic abuse, or sexual intercourse . . . and lacks serious 
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.”179  Subsections 1466A(a)(2) and 
 
 168. The rule against superfluities “instructs courts to interpret a statute to effectuate all its 
provisions, so that no part is rendered superfluous.”  Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 89 (2004). 
 169. Whorley III, 550 F.3d at 351 (Gregory, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 170. Id. at 351–52. 
 171. United States v. Handley, 564 F. Supp. 2d 996 (S.D. Iowa 2008). 
 172. Id. at 999. 
 173. Id. at 998–99. 
 174. Id. at 1009. 
 175. Id. 
 176. 18 U.S.C. § 1466A(a)(1) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 177. Id. § 1466A(b)(1) (emphasis added). 
 178. Handley, 564 F. Supp. 2d at 1009. 
 179. 18 U.S.C. § 1466A(a)(2), (b)(2). 
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(b)(2) require only the third prong of the Miller test for obscenity—that the 
depiction lack “serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value”—while 
leaving out the remaining two requirements that the depiction appeal to the 
“prurient interest” and that it be “patently offensive.”180 
The court in Handley reasons that because the pictures were not of real children, 
the indictments were not governed by Ferber, but rather by Miller, as under Miller 
all “obscene” depictions can constitutionally be criminalized, including cartoons.181  
If the indictments are governed by Miller, why do § 1466A(a)(2) and (b)(2) include 
only one prong from the Miller test?  The court finds the absence of the first and 
second prongs of the Miller test from § 1466A(a)(2) and (b)(2) dispositive and 
holds § 1466A(a)(2) and (b)(2) unconstitutional.182 
Why did Congress leave the first and second prongs of the Miller test out of § 
1466A(a)(2) and (b)(2)?  Did Congress simply assume that such depictions are 
“patently offensive” and appeal to the “prurient interest”?  The Handley court notes 
the 
almost complete redundancy of the conduct criminalized by subsections 1466A(a)(1) 
and (b)(1) with that of subsections 1466A(a)(2) and (b)(2).  The [only] observable 
differences between these subsections are (1) subsections 1466A(a)(1) and (b)(1) 
incorporate the Miller test as essential elements, whereas subsections 1466A(a)(2) and 
(b)(2) do not; (2) subsections 1466A(a)(2) and (b)(2) include the “appears to be” 
language in relation to “a minor,” and (3) subsections 1466A(a)(1) and (b)(1) 
encompass a broader list of sexually explicit conduct.183 
This strange statutory construction is notable in two respects:  first, it is clearly 
an attempt to circumvent the holding of Ashcroft by adding the “appears to be a 
minor” language, allowing prosecution of “convincing” virtual child pornography 
or pornography of adults who are “made to look” like children—prosecution which 
is frankly questionable under Ashcroft.184  Second, § 1466A(a)(2) and (b)(2) seem 
to function as “expanders” on § 1466A(a)(1) and (b)(1), almost as if Congress were 
afraid that some of the material it wanted to criminalize would not be found 
“obscene.”  This fear seems unfounded, given that the “the vast majority (99–
100%) of all child pornography would be found to be obscene by most judges and 
juries.”185 
 
 180. Handley, 564 F. Supp. 2d at 1005. 
 181. Id. at 1001–02. 
 182. Id. at 1009. 
 183. Id. at 1007. 
 184. Prosecution of “virtual” child pornography is questionable because the Supreme Court held in 
Ashcroft that such pornography “records no crime and creates no victims by its production [and] is not 
‘intrinsically related’ to the sexual abuse of children.”  Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 236 
(2002). 
 185. Letter from Daniel Armagh, supra note 125. 
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II.  THOUGHT CRIMES, MONSTERS AND FICTIONALIZATION: 
PUTTING WHORLEY IN THE CONTEXT OF FANTASY 
In an entertaining and disturbing essay called Producing Erotic Children, James 
Kincaid says: 
Let us take the stories of Ellie Nesler, Menendez, Woody Allen, Michael Jackson, the 
day-care trial du jour, and ask about the source, the nature, and the size of the 
pleasures we take from such stories.  What are these stories, where do they come 
from, and why do we tell them with such relish? . . . .  Why do we tell the stories we 
tell?  Why do we need to hear them?  Those are plain sorts of questions; but we don’t 
often attend to them.  We prefer others: 
1.  How can we spot the pedophiles and get rid of them? 
2.  Meanwhile, how can we protect our children? 
3.  How can we induce our children to tell us the truth, and all of it, about their 
sexual lives? 
4.  How can we get the courts to believe children who say they have been sexually 
molested? 
. . . . 
they all have one thing in common:  they demand the same answer, “We can’t.” 
I think that is why . . . the . . . stories are so popular:  they have about them an urgency 
and a self-flattering righteous oomph.  Asking them, I can get the feeling that I care 
very much, and that I am really on the right side in these vital issues of our time.  
Even better, these open-ended, unanswerable questions generate variations on 
themselves, and allow us to keep them going, circulating them among ourselves 
without ever experiencing fatigue, never getting enough of what they are offering.186 
Kincaid’s argument owes much to Foucault’s History of Sexuality.187  
Foucault’s central claim in that work is that our conception of sex—as something 
repressed by a censorious Victorian culture and then liberated by a twentieth-
century freedom—is fundamentally mistaken.188  Our mistake is the result of an 
incomplete and incorrect conception of power.189  Adler paraphrases Foucault’s 
insight in the context of first amendment law: 
Power works only marginally through repression and prohibition; it exerts itself most 
strongly through tools of apparent liberation. . . .  [O]ne way power spreads its grasp 
is through an “incitement to discourse.” . . . Foucault writes, “[W]hat we now perceive 
 
 186. James R. Kincaid, Producing Erotic Children, in THE CHILDREN’S CULTURE READER 241, 
246 (Henry Jenkins ed., 1998) (emphasis added) [hereinafter Kincaid, Producing]. 
 187. MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY, VOLUME ONE:  AN INTRODUCTION 
(Robert Hurley trans., 1990) (1978). 
 188. See generally id. at 1–49. 
 189. See generally id. at 92–102. 
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as the chronicle of a censorship and the difficult struggle to remove it will be seen 
rather as the centuries-long rise of a complex deployment for compelling sex to speak, 
for fastening our attention and concern upon sex.” . . . This “transforming of sex into 
discourse” served an insidious purpose.  First, it opened up channels for disciplinary 
power:  The more we discuss sex, the more we develop norms and then scrutinize our 
deviations from the norm.  But more importantly . . . the transformation of sex into 
discourse changed the “nature” of sex. . . .  Foucault does not deny that censorship 
exists.  Yet, any emphasis on it is a ruse.  Censorship is only “part of the strategies 
that underlie and permeate discourses.” . . .  Censorship is just a way of shifting the 
vocabulary.190 
What Kincaid describes is an enormous social “incitement to discourse.”  We 
are pleasured, as he says, by the endless circulation of stories about child 
molesters, danger to children and innocence lost.  But, as Adler adds in her 
comments about “To Catch A Predator,” our pleasures and identifications with 
these stories are so disturbing they must be disavowed.  We can stand completely 
apart from pedophiles, morally righteous, all while we crave, need and get 
ourselves close to pedophilia.  Kincaid continues, discussing Michael Jackson: 
Take the fun in being outraged with Michael Jackson as boy-lover, and telling our 
friends how outraged we are.  And not just with Jackson either, but with the failure of 
others to be as loving to children as we are:  “Can you imagine anyone letting a son 
sleep with that man?” . . . Had Michael Jackson not existed, we would have been 
forced to invent him, which is, of course, what we did.191 
We “shift the vocabulary,” as Adler says, by expressing outrage at the very 
existence of such books as the Pedophile’s Guide, then by spending hours building 
Facebook pages and Twitter communication logs about how outrageous it is that 
Amazon could carry them.192  Congress “transforms sex into discourse,” as 
Foucault would say, by holding press conferences disavowing the conclusions of 
psychologists who conclude that child sexual abuse does not always cause the kind 
of intense harm we all believe it does—again, the vote was 355 to zero.193 
The law does not stand apart from these social narratives; it participates in them.  
The law participates by constructing the pedophile, then providing the righteous 
punishment society decides he so deserves.  As Kincaid writes, “Pedophiles have 
not really been, as we like to say, ‘othered,’ or marginalized; they have been 
removed from the species, rendered unknowable.”194  Understanding this 
construction is crucial to understanding how “[c]hild pornography has become a 
thought crime,” as Adler argues.195  Efforts to deal with pedophilia have also 
 
 190. Adler, Perverse, supra note 17, at 268–70. 
 191. Kincaid, Producing, supra note 186, at 243. 
 192. Adler, Perverse, supra note 17, at 270 (“Censorship is just a way of shifting the 
vocabulary.”). 
 193. FOUCAULT, supra note 187, at 17–22 (discussing “the great process of transforming sex into 
discourse”); see supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
 194. KINCAID, EROTIC, supra note 18, at 88. 
 195. Adler, Inverting, supra note 22, at 995. 
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arguably resulted in status crimes—criminalizing statuses or identities rather than 
criminal acts.  Judge Gregory’s dissent in Whorley expresses serious concern about 
the “right to use our imaginations to create fantasies,” but on the other side of the 
liberties he raises is—what I would argue drives Judge Niemeyer’s opinion—the 
specter of the pedophile.196  In Judge Niemeyer’s majority opinion, the “right to use 
our imaginations to create fantasies” is not what is at stake.  What is at stake is the 
right for pedophiles—the unknowable, wholly Other, evil nonhumans—to use their 
imaginations to create fantasies.  Who is going to complain much about that?197  
Pedophiles are “cultural demon[s],” monsters: the only way we remain 
unpossessed, unmonstrous, is to remain silent to whatever rights they might have, 
or to find a way to dismiss them.198  That is precisely what the court does in 
Whorley. 
This Part first outlines Judge Gregory’s dissenting opinion, followed by a 
discussion of Doe v. City of Lafayette, Indiana, a Seventh Circuit case not 
involving pornography or obscenity but which deals with pedophilia and the 
freedom of thought more broadly.199  This reading of Doe in turn highlights the 
construction of the pedophile in Whorley.  Specifically, this comparison lends 
support to Judge Gregory’s effort to expose Whorley’s policing of fantasy, 
essentially making the expression of certain thoughts illegal.  Finally, this Part 
returns to the larger cultural narrative of pedophilia in which both Whorley and Doe 
play a part. 
In the Seventh Circuit (en banc) decision in Doe v. City of Lafayette, Indiana, 
the court begins its opinion directly: 
John Doe has a long history of arrests and convictions for . . . child molestation, 
attempted child molestation, voyeurism, exhibitionism, and peeping.  These crimes 
date back to 1978, when Mr. Doe went into a locker room at a local school, pulled 
down the swimsuit of a ten-year-old boy and performed oral sex on him.200 
The description of Doe’s history as a pedophile and child molester goes on 
through the 1980s and ’90s.201  The “crime” at the heart of this case occurred when 
Doe, driving home from work, stopped at a public park and watched five young 
teenagers playing baseball.202  He thought about molesting them, but without 
touching or even approaching them, he drove away.203  He immediately called his 
psychologist, upset about the possible encounter, and later described the incident to 
his Sexual Addicts Anonymous group.204  An anonymous source reported Doe’s 
 
 196. Whorley III, 550 F.3d 326, 353 (4th Cir. 2008) (Gregory, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part). 
 197. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
 198. KINCAID, EROTIC, supra note 18, at 88. 
 199. Doe v. City of Lafayette, Ind., 377 F.3d 757 (7th Cir. 2004) (en banc). 
 200. Id. at 758. 
 201. Id. at 758–59. 
 202. Id. at 774 (Williams, J., dissenting). 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. at 775. 
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visit to the park to Doe’s former probation officer (he was no longer on probation at 
this time), who contacted the local police department, parks department and a city 
attorney.205  The parks department issued a permanent order banning Doe from 
entering any city park for any reason.206 
Like the majority in Whorley, the majority in Doe rejects John Doe’s first 
amendment claims.  In fact, the court finds these claims to be entirely baseless, 
writing: 
He did not go to the park to advocate the legalization of sexual relations between 
adults and minors.  He did not go into the park to display a sculpture, read a poem or 
perform a play celebrating sexual relations between adults and minors.  He did not go 
into the park for some higher purpose of self-realization through expression.  In fact, 
he did not go into the park to engage in expression at all.  Rather, he went “cruising” 
in the parks “looking for children” to satisfy his sexual urges.207 
The court finds that there was no expressive element; “we have nothing 
approaching ‘expression’; instead, we have predation.”208  Nor did the city, 
according to the court, punish Doe for pure thoughts.  “The inescapable reality,” the 
court writes, 
is that Mr. Doe did not simply entertain thoughts; he brought himself to the brink of 
committing child molestation. . . .  To characterize the ban as directed at ‘pure 
thought’ would require us to close our eyes to Mr. Doe’s actions.  It also would 
require that we give short shrift to Mr. Doe’s condition as an admitted 
pedophile . . . .209 
Judge Williams, dissenting in Doe, aptly points out that the majority opinion has 
“secondary effects,” one of which is to deter sex offenders from therapy.210  “Once 
released back into our society, a former sex offender must feel free to seek therapy 
and must be supported in his efforts to control his urges rather than penalized.  
Why deter former sex offenders from one of the few treatments available?  The 
importance of therapy cannot be understated.”211  Notably, Doe was voluntarily 
taking Depo-Provera, the “chemical castration” drug, after the incident at the 
park.212  This entire case arose after Doe sought help from his psychologist and his 
Sexual Addicts Anonymous group.213 
Perhaps society does not care about Doe’s recovery, though.  Doe’s past acts 
 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. at 763 (majority opinion). 
 208. Id. at 764 (emphasis added). 
 209. Id. at 767 (emphasis added). 
 210. Id. at 784 (Williams, J., dissenting). 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. at 775.  Depo-Provera, a drug that lowers the testosterone level in men, is thought to lower 
male sex drive.  See B. Drummond Ayres Jr., California Child Molesters Face ‘Chemical Castration’, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 1996, at A1. 
 213. Doe, 377 F.3d at 775 (Williams, J., dissenting). 
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may be seen as so monstrous as to create a mythical monster—one which, like 
monsters in literature, has but one possible fate:  to be cast out from society.214  For 
instance, in 2000, two British newspapers published pictures of convicted 
pedophiles in a “name and shame” media campaign.215  The result?  “A mob of 300 
people were reported to have gone on a rampage outside the home of a man 
suspected to be a pedophile because he had worn a neck brace similar to one worn 
in one of the published photos.  The group was mistaken.”216  The man in the neck 
brace with the unfortunate likeness was not left alone after the initial mob attack; a 
brick was thrown through an adjoining house’s window, hitting yet another 
nonpedophile, the man’s ex-wife.217 A former police chief warned that the “name 
and shame” campaign could in fact “drive the perverts underground, making it 
more difficult for the authorities to monitor them,” and could result in more 
“vigilante attacks.”218 
In a work examining “extreme deviance,” Erich Goode and D. Angus Vail note 
that “pedophiles and child molesters are probably the most socially disvalued of all 
deviants in America” and that they have been increasingly greeted by “offender 
registries, community notification, civil commitments, and even castration.”219  The 
 
 214. For the complexities of cultural narratives concerning monsters, particularly the aspects of 
“monstrous” gender and sexuality, see generally, e.g., STEPHEN NEALE, GENRE (1980); KINCAID, 
EROTIC, supra note 18; THE HORROR FILM AND PSYCHOANALYSIS:  FREUD’S WORST NIGHTMARE 
(Steven Jay Schneider ed., 2004); ANDREW TUDOR, MONSTERS AND MAD SCIENTISTS:  A CULTURAL 
HISTORY OF THE HORROR MOVIE (1989). 
 215. See Angelides, supra note 46, at 80. 
 216. Id. at 80; see also Stephen Wright & James Mills, Paedophile Vigilantes Attack the Wrong 
Man; As Photographs of Sex Offenders Are Published in the Wake of Sarah the Payne’s Killing, 
Outpouring of Grief That Recalls the Tributes to Diana, DAILY MAIL (London), Jul. 24, 2000, at 8–9 
(“‘The crowd were all shouting “paedophile.”  It was terrifying.  I showed the police my driving licence 
and other documents and even went outside myself to try and explain.’ . . . [P]olice installed a panic 
button in Mr. Armstrong’s home in case trouble flared again.”). 
 217. Wright & Mills, supra note 216. 
 218. Id. 
 219. ERICH GOODE & D. ANGUS VAIL, EXTREME DEVIANCE 150 (2008).  There has been a fair 
amount of scholarship regarding these punishments.  See, e.g., LAURA J. ZILNEY & LISA ANNE ZILNEY, 
PERVERTS AND PREDATORS:  THE MAKING OF SEXUAL OFFENDING LAWS (2009); LISA ANNE ZILNEY & 
LAURA J. ZILNEY, RECONSIDERING SEX CRIMES AND OFFENDERS:  PROSECUTION OR PERSECUTION? 
(2009); Adler, Perverse, supra note 17; Jesse P. Basbaum, Note, Inequitable Sentencing for Possession 
of Child Pornography:  A Failure to Distinguish Voyeurs from Pederasts, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 1281 
(2010); Lystra Batchoo, Note, Voluntary Chemical Castration of Sex Offenders:  Waiving the Eighth 
Amendment Protection from Cruel and Unusual Punishments, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 689 (2007); Rose 
Corrigan, Making Meaning of Megan’s Law, 31 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 267 (2006); Michael J. Duster, 
Note, Out of Sight, Out of Mind:  State Attempts to Banish Sex Offenders, 53 DRAKE L. REV. 711 
(2005); Joseph J. Fishcel, Transcendent Homosexuals and Dangerous Sex Offenders:  Sexual Harm and 
Freedom in the Judicial Imaginary, 18 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 277 (2010); Linda Gordon, The 
Politics of Child Sexual Abuse:  Notes from American History, 28 FEMINIST REV. 56 (1988); Bret R. 
Hobson, Note, Banishing Acts:  How Far May States Go to Keep Convicted Sex Offenders from 
Children?, 40 GA. L. REV. 961 (2006); Wayne A. Logan, The Adam Walsh Act and the Failed Promise 
of Administrative Federalism, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 993 (2010); Jacob D. Mahle, Comment and 
Casenote, We Don’t Need No Thought Control:  Doe v. City of Lafayette, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 235 
(2005); Jennifer B. Siverts, Note, Punishing Thoughts Too Close to Reality:  A New Solution to Protect 
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latter remedy has had surprisingly widespread support.  California, Florida, 
Georgia, Oregon, Montana, Wisconsin, Iowa and Louisiana are among the states 
that have imposed forced chemical castration—administering Depo-Provera, the 
drug John Doe voluntarily took—for some sex offenders.220  An editorial in The 
New Yorker advocated allowing sex offenders to voluntarily undergo physical 
castration, asking, “Why . . . resist the demands of men who are willing to risk 
sacrificing sexual activity in order to be free of their damaging impulses? . . . . If 
castration helps, why not let them have what they want?”221  In the 1990s, 
Louisiana imposed a mandatory sentence of death or life in prison for adults who 
rape victims under age twelve.222  In 2007, the American Bar Association Journal 
noted that Montana, South Carolina and Oklahoma had followed suit with similar 
laws.223   Commenting on State v. Wilson, the Louisiana Supreme Court case that 
upheld the constitutionality of imposing the death penalty on a child rapist, one 
student note observed that “[i]n the last decade or two, society has come to view 
rapists whose victims are children as the gangrene of humanity, an infection in the 
limb of society that must be amputated in order to prevent the inevitable spreading 
of depravity to the healthy body of human morality.”224 
The foregoing themes of castration, amputation and casting off are consistent 
with the rhetoric of “obscenity” discussed in connection with Whorley, supra.  
Attorney Matthew Benjamin has suggested that the “intense regard for public 
 
Children from Pedophiles, 27 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 393 (2005); Marbree D. Sullivan, Comment, The 
Thought Police:  Doling Out Punishment for Thinking About Criminal Behavior in John Doe v. City of 
Lafayette, 40 NEW ENG. L. REV. 263 (2005); Corey Rayburn Yung, The Emerging Criminal War on Sex 
Offenders, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 435 (2010).  Very recently, there have been prosecutions of 
minors who take sexually oriented pictures of themselves under child pornography laws, called 
“sexting” laws; in these cases, as Adler remarks, the “predator” and the “prey” are one and the same.  
See Adler, To Catch a Predator, supra note 39.  Further commentary on this issue is beyond the scope 
of this Note.  See Riva Richmond, Sexting May Place Teens at Legal Risk, N.Y. TIMES GADGETWISE 
BLOG (Mar. 26, 2009, 12:00 PM), http: //gadgetwise.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/03/26/sexting-may-place-
teens-at-legal-risk/?scp=2&sq=sexting&st=cse (“One in five teens may be a child pornographer risking 
life in prison—for the crime of taking and distributing naked pictures of themselves. . . .  The 
combination of poorly drafted laws, new technologies, draconian and inflexible punishments, and 
teenage hormones make [sic] for potentially disastrous results.”).  There has also already been sparse 
academic commentary on the issue.  See Amy F. Kimpel, Using Laws Designed to Protect as a Weapon:  
Prosecuting Minors Under Child Pornography Laws, 34 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 299 (2010); 
Sarah Wastler, The Harm in “Sexting”?:  Analyzing the Constitutionality of Child Pornography Statutes 
that Prohibit the Voluntary Production, Possession, and Dissemination of Sexually Explicit Images by 
Teenagers, 33 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 687 (2010). 
 220. Ayres, supra note 212, at A1; Kristin Carlson, Commentary, Strong Medicine:  Toward 
Effective Sentencing of Child Pornography Offenders, 109 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 27, 31 
(2010).  The American Civil Liberties Union has opposed forced chemical castration as cruel and 
unusual punishment.  Id. at 31. 
 221. Editorial, Help for Sex Offenders, THE NEW YORKER, Mar. 7, 1994, at 6. 
 222. See State v. Wilson, 685 So. 2d 1063 (La. 1996) (upholding this sentencing).  Since Furman 
v. Georgia, the U.S. Supreme Court has not sanctioned capital punishment for crimes not resulting in the 
death of the victim.  Jennifer L. Cordle, Note, State v. Wilson:  Social Discontent, Retribution, and the 
Constitutionality of Capital Punishment for Raping a Child, 27 CAP. U. L. REV. 135, 135 (1998). 
 223. John Gibeaut, A Deal with Death, 93 A.B.A. J. 12, 13 (2007). 
 224. Cordle, supra note 222, at 135. 
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morality” at the center of obscenity law is often expressed “in terms of purity, 
pollution, and contamination.”225  He continues: 
Pollution rhetoric also affects society’s sense of the appropriate punishment for 
criminal sexual behavior.  Pervasive cultural associations between criminals and 
pollution encourage penological strategies that quarantine prisoners in spaces that 
reflect their degraded moral condition.  The punishments designed for child 
pornographers illustrate this correspondence. . . .  In one instance, the City Council of 
Jersey City barred such individuals from virtually the entire city.  The pervasive 
connection between pollution anxieties and child pornography law surely accounts for 
this atypical visceral treatment of offenders themselves as pollutants.226 
Analyzing and criticizing the “monster-making” rhetoric at the heart of 
legislation and jurisprudence dealing with minors, sex and obscenity does not 
imply that child sexual abuse is less than monstrous.  Nor is it a recommendation 
that pedophiles be allowed to “express themselves.”  Nor is it to paint pedophiles as 
an oppressed minority.  As Judith Butler has written in the context of global 
terrorism and national security, the “frame” of social and intellectual discussion 
“decides, in a forceful way, what we can hear, whether a view will be taken as 
explanation or as exoneration . . . .”227  The heightened anxiety of the frame of 
pedophilia in society makes it all the more urgent to critically question “what we 
can hear,” as “[c]hild pornography law is the new crucible of the First 
Amendment . . . test[ing] the limits of modern free speech law the way political 
dissent did in the times of Holmes and Brandeis.”228 
III.  FANTASY, OBSCENITY AND THE ARTS 
A.  THE RIGHT TO FANTASIZE 
1.  Judge Gregory’s Dissents in Whorley:  A “Constitutional Safe Harbor” for 
Obscenity 
Judge Gregory dissented strongly in Whorley, both on the panel and in the denial 
of rehearing en banc.229  In contrast to Judge Niemeyer’s approach in the majority 
opinion, Judge Gregory first reminds us of the Supreme Court’s magisterial 
 
 225. Matthew Benjamin, Possessing Pollution, 31 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 733, 737 
(2007). 
 226. Id. at 769–70 (emphasis in original); see also Mona Lynch, Pedophiles and Cyber-Predators 
as Contaminating Forces:  The Language of Disgust, Pollution, and Boundary Invasions in Federal 
Debates on Sex Offender Legislation, 27 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 529 (2002).  For more on the operation 
of “pollution” in the law more generally, both in “natural environments” and “human environments,” see 
John Copeland Nagle, The Idea of Pollution, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1 (2009). 
 227. JUDITH BUTLER, PRECARIOUS LIFE:  THE POWERS OF MOURNING AND VIOLENCE 4–5 (2006). 
 228. Adler, Inverting, supra note 22, at 921. 
 229. Whorley IV, 569 F.3d 211, 211–14 (4th Cir. 2009) (Gregory, J., dissenting from the denial of 
rehearing en banc); Whorley III, 550 F.3d 326, 343–53 (4th Cir. 2008) (Gregory, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part). 
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pronouncement in Stanley that “[o]ur whole constitutional heritage rebels at the 
thought of giving government the power to control men’s minds.”230  He even cites 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which claims the freedom of speech as 
“the highest aspiration of the common people.”231  From the beginning, Judge 
Gregory sees Whorley as an important case that has at its core the most basic 
liberties, ones that cannot be taken away no matter how despicable their holders.232 
Judge Gregory outlines Supreme Court obscenity and child pornography 
jurisprudence at length.233  On the one hand, he expresses doubts about obscenity 
law, observing that the “Supreme Court’s attempts to define obscenity for over half 
a century, including its enunciations of differing standards for obscenity and child 
pornography, reveal one truth:  a material’s obscenity, or lack thereof, ultimately 
depends on the subjective view of at least five individuals.”234  This opinion 
echoes, among other opinions, Justice Harlan’s dissent-in-part in Roth, over fifty 
years ago: “The Court seems to assume that ‘obscenity’ is a peculiar genus of 
‘speech and press,’ which is as distinct, recognizable, and classifiable as poison ivy 
is among other plants.”235  It also echoes Justice Douglas’s dissent in 12 200-Foot 
Reels:  “by what right under the Constitution do five of us have to impose our set of 
values on the literature of the day?”236  On the other hand, Judge Gregory asserts 
that “in every society, there are fundamental norms of decency and morality that 
cannot be transgressed if that society is to function in a healthy and productive 
manner.”237  Protecting children is undoubtedly a fundamental norm of decency 
and morality.238 
Judge Gregory is most concerned by the ruling regarding the emails.  He notes 
that the email correspondence was between “consenting adults.”239  The emails 
Whorley sent and received (most were received) were “a series of engaging in 
fantasies on the internet of one person talking about their fantasy, and another 
 
 230. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969).  Consider also the argument that Blasi makes: 
[T]he basic commitment to free expression and inquiry must be considered one of the central 
features of the American constitutional regime.  One need not blot from vision the intermittent 
periods of widespread, systematic repression of dissenters to appreciate the importance of free 
speech in the development of the American republic. 
Blasi, supra note 93, at 456. 
 231. Whorley III, 550 F.3d at 343 (Gregory, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 
1948)). 
 232. See Whorley IV, 569 F.3d at 214 (Gregory, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc) 
(“This is an important and difficult case . . . .”). 
 233. See Whorley III, 550 F.3d at 343–46. 
 234. Id. at 346. 
 235. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 497 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring in the result in No. 61, 
dissenting in No. 582). 
 236. United States v. 12 200-Foot Reels of Super 8mm. Film, 413 U.S. 123, 137 (1973) (quoted in 
Whorley III, 550 F.3d at 346 (Gregory, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). 
 237. Whorley III, 550 F.3d at 346 (Gregory, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 238. Id. 
 239. Id. at 343. 
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asking questions about what they’ve done, what they haven’t done.”240  No real 
children were discussed.241  Judge Gregory thinks it “obvious” that the district 
court should have dismissed the charges based on the emails “because the Supreme 
Court has never come close to holding that the private fantasies of an adult are not 
protected by the First Amendment.”242 
Judge Gregory also sees the logic of the Supreme Court’s child pornography 
decisions, back to Ferber, as relevant in considering the emails:  because “the 
regulation of [the emails] is unsupported by the economic and moral concerns 
implicated in suppressing child pornography that uses actual children,” the 
application of the obscenity statute to Whorley violates the First Amendment.243  
Judge Niemeyer glosses over Gregory’s concerns, however, in his terse opinion 
supporting the denial of rehearing en banc:  “Whorley violated criminal statutes 
regulating obscenity, and his convictions may not be forgiven because his conduct 
was prompted by his sexual fantasies.”244 
If the emails and cartoon pictures were analyzed as possible child pornography, 
it would seem that under Ashcroft and Ferber, some harm to actual children would 
need to be shown or presumed.  The Court in Ashcroft stated that virtual child 
pornography creates no victims and records no crime—if this is true for virtual 
child pornography, it would seem true for fictional cartoon pictures and emails 
describing fantasies of imagined children.245  But because the emails and cartoon 
pictures can be swept into the category of obscenity under the PROTECT Act, 
Judge Niemeyer would have us believe there is no first amendment problem. 
Judge Gregory’s answer, in his dissent from the denial of rehearing en banc, is 
even clearer than in his panel opinion: 
Where the state has a legitimate interest in regulating obscene materials—for 
example, where those materials are being commercially traded and/or where those 
materials are the product of the abuse or exploitation of their subjects—the First 
Amendment’s protections may not apply.  But where the only articulable interest in 
regulation is a fear of the expression of certain kinds of thoughts, even obscenity must 
be given a constitutional safe harbor.  “Stanley rests on the proposition that freedom 
from governmental manipulation of the content of a man’s mind necessitates a ban on 
punishment for the mere possession of the memorabilia of a man’s thoughts and 
dreams, unless that punishment can be related to a state interest of a stronger nature 
than the simple desire to proscribe obscenity as such.”246 
The facts that Whorley marshals to paint a picture of harmless fantasy—the 
 
 240. Id. at 348. 
 241. Id. 
 242. Id. 
 243. Id. at 343. 
 244. Whorley IV, 569 F.3d 211, 211 (4th Cir. 2009) (Niemeyer, J., supporting the denial of 
rehearing en banc). 
 245. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 250 (2002). 
 246. Whorley IV, 569 F.3d at 213–14 (Gregory, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc) 
(quoting United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351, 359 (1971)) (emphasis added). 
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emails were not commercial, nor were they the product of abuse or exploitation of 
anyone—are irrelevant to the majority’s analysis.  The majority seems to say that 
there is no right to fantasize for pedophiles. Judge Gregory, on the other hand, 
would provide “a constitutional safe harbor” for obscenity in cases “where the only 
articulable interest in regulation is a fear of the expression of certain kinds of 
thoughts.”247  But given the intensity of the fear and the overwhelming desire to 
punish and cast pedophiles out of society, the notion that the public would accept 
such a “safe harbor” seems absurd.  Judge Gregory’s defense of the constitutional 
right of pedophiles to trade emails about horrible things thus seems almost 
pointless, but it is not.  Such “a stark example of speech suppression” seen in the 
criminalization of fantastical emails hollows out the First Amendment, for all of 
us.248 
 2.  Judge Williams’s Dissent in Doe v. City of Lafayette, Ind.:  The Child 
Molester’s Right to Fantasize 
Judge Williams conceives of the case differently from the majority in Doe, 
arguing that the “question . . . is whether the First Amendment protects a citizen 
who goes to a venue and thinks about committing a crime.”249  Judge Williams 
thinks it undoubtedly does, considering the long-standing rule that government 
does not have the power to control its citizens’ minds, and heeding “the crucial 
distinction between thinking and acting on those thoughts.”250  Judge Williams 
notes that in Ferber, Osborne and Ashcroft, actual harm suffered by minor 
participants in pornography was an essential component of the holdings that child 
pornography was not protected.251  Here, no one was harmed, affected or 
apparently even cognizant of Doe’s presence at the park or his status as a 
pedophile.252 
Judge Williams also raises the eighth amendment prohibition on punishing a 
citizen based on his or her status.253  In Robinson v. California, the Supreme Court 
invalidated a statute making addiction to narcotics illegal, holding that the statute’s 
criminalization of a mere status violated the protection against cruel and unusual 
punishment.254  Judge Williams asks whether it would be proper (and 
constitutional) to sanction criminal punishment of a bank robber (“a crime, like 
child molestation, with a high rate of recidivism”) who stands in the parking lot of 
a bank and contemplates robbing it, or a drug addict who stands outside a dealer’s 
 
 247. Id. 
 248. Whorley III, 550 F.3d at 350 (Gregory, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting 
Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 244). 
 249. Doe v. City of Lafayette, Ind., 377 F.3d at 778 (en banc) (Williams, J., dissenting). 
 250. Id. 
 251. Id. at 778–79. 
 252. Id. at 779. 
 253. Id. at 782. 
 254. Id.; see Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962). 
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house thinking about buying drugs but leaves without doing so.255  Surely, it would 
not.  This is because, as the Supreme Court said in Robinson, “a law which made a 
criminal offense of” being mentally ill, afflicted with leprosy or infected with a 
venereal disease “would doubtless be universally thought to be an infliction of 
cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments.”256 
Also, as Adler notes, the distinction between thought/speech and action is a core 
element of first amendment law.257  In Whorley, Judge Gregory attempts to 
preserve this distinction when he says, “just as the fantasies of a drug addict are his 
own and beyond the reach of government . . . the fantasies of a child pornographer 
should be as well.”258  However, as Adler further argues, and as discussed in Part I 
of this Note, child pornography law rejected this distinction.259  Ferber upheld the 
criminalization of the depictions of crimes.260  The Osborne Court upheld the 
criminalization of mere possession of child pornography, and found persuasive the 
idea that the possession of child pornography could be criminalized based on the 
fact that pedophiles might use child pornography to seduce children.261  As noted 
earlier, the idea that speech may be suppressed because of bad uses to which it 
might be put is unique in first amendment law.  Judges Gregory and Williams try to 
distinguish the thoughts of pedophiles from the actions of child molestation, but the 
child pornography cases show that for pedophiles, speech and action are bound 
together in a way unheard of for nonpedophiles. 
Judge Williams recognizes that pedophilia is a particularly culturally sensitive 
topic.  For this reason she proposes that we look at the examples of drug addicts 
and bank robbers, “analogies removed from the sensitive context of child 
molestation.”262  But child molestation and pedophilia are more than just “sensitive 
contexts” in contemporary culture, as discussed in Part II, supra.  Commenting on 
the Amazon affair of 2010, former chief of the U.S. Justice Department’s child 
 
 255. Doe, 377 F.3d at 783 (en banc) (Williams, J., dissenting). 
 256. Robinson, 370 U.S. at 666. 
 257. See Adler, Inverting, supra note 22, at 972–73 (“As Thomas Emerson wrote, ‘[t]he central 
idea of a system of freedom of expression is that a fundamental distinction must be drawn between 
conduct which consists of “expression” and conduct which consists of “action.”’” (quoting THOMAS I. 
EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 17 (1970))). 
 258. Whorley III, 550 F.3d 326, 350 (4th Cir. 2008) (Gregory, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part). 
 259. See Adler, Inverting, supra note 22, at 982, 986 (describing Ferber’s “ero[sion] of the 
speech/action distinction . . . introduc[ing] the idea that a representation can be banned because of the 
underlying illegal act that produced it” and “[c]hild pornography law[’s] conflat[ion of] act and image 
on a rhetorical as well as a legal level”). 
 260. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756 (1982) (“[W]e are persuaded that the States are 
entitled to greater leeway in the regulation of pornographic depictions of children.”) (emphasis added); 
Adler, Inverting, supra note 22, at 982. 
 261. Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 111 (1990) (holding that “Ohio may constitutionally 
proscribe the possession and viewing of child pornography” and recognizing “evidence” that “suggests 
that pedophiles use child pornography to seduce other children into sexual activity”). 
 262. Doe v. City of Lafayette, Ind., 377 F.3d 757, 783 (7th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (Williams, J., 
dissenting). 
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exploitation and obscenity section, attorney Patrick Trueman, said, “Pedophilia and 
child molestation are universally condemned.”263  Although the Supreme Court 
stated in Stanley that “State . . . control [of] the moral content of a person’s 
thoughts . . . may be a noble purpose, but it is wholly inconsistent with the 
philosophy of the First Amendment,” in the context of something so “universally 
condemned,” the First Amendment bends.264  Pedophiles have no right to be free of 
such state control.  As Judge Williams concludes, when it is a crime to go 
somewhere, to think about doing illegal things and then to decide against doing 
those things, “the freedoms guaranteed by the First Amendment are virtually 
meaningless.”265 
B.  CHILDREN, OBSCENITY AND THE THREAT TO THE ARTS 
The federal courts, or at least some judges, hesitate when the subject of the arts 
is raised, even in the context of the unsavory fantasies and tastes of pedophiles.  
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Ashcroft invokes artistic fictions to show 
that the CPPA is overbroad: 
William Shakespeare created the most famous pair of teenage lovers, one of whom is 
just 13 years of age. . . .  The movie, Traffic, which was nominated for Best 
Picture . . . portrays a teenager [who eventually] trade[s] sex for drugs . . . American 
Beauty [portrays] a teenage girl engag[ing] in sexual relations with her teenage 
boyfriend, and another yields herself to the gratification of a middle-aged man.266 
The concurring opinions in Ferber illustrate a similar concern.267 
Judge Gregory locates Whorley’s emails in a “zone of expression accepted as 
having artistic value.”268  He analyzes the case in a similar vein as Ashcroft, citing 
such novels as Walker’s The Color Purple, Faulkner’s Absalom, Absalom!, 
Nabokov’s Lolita and the film American Beauty to argue that 
the iconic books and movies above render unsustainable the claim that writings 
describing sexual acts between children and adults, generated by fantasy, have no 
demonstrated socially redeeming artistic value.  If the writers of the aforementioned 
books and movie scripts e-mailed the sections of their work that described the sexual 
relationship between the minor and the adult to a willing recipient, presumably both 
the writer and the recipient could have been subject to prosecution for sending or 
receiving obscene material under § 1462.269 
 
 263. Cheryl Wetzstein, Amazon.com Draws Criticism for Selling Pedophilia Book, WASH. TIMES, 
Nov. 12, 2010, A5 (emphasis added). 
 264. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565–66 (1969) (emphasis added). 
 265. Doe, 377 F.3d at 785 (en banc) (Williams, J., dissenting). 
 266. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 247–48 (2002). 
 267. See supra note 105. 
 268. Whorley III, 550 F.3d 326, 349 (4th Cir. 2008) (Gregory, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part). 
 269. Id. 
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Judge Gregory is thus worried about the effects of the holdings in Whorley on the 
arts. 
Judge Niemeyer would likely reply that obscenity law provides a definite 
safeguard for artists and writers who need not worry so long as their work satisfies 
the Miller test and is thus not judged “obscene.”270  But, as Adler points out, the 
Miller test is no protection at all in the contemporary “postmodern” world:  “the 
very foundation of Miller, the belief that some art is just not good enough or 
serious enough to be worthy of protection, mirrors the Modernist notion that 
distinctions could be drawn between good art and bad, and that the value of art was 
objectively verifiable.”271  Moreover, “the most basic premise of Miller:  that art 
can be distinguished from obscenity” is probably invalid.272  Some artists and 
writers are deliberately offensive and create works that fly in the face of 
“seriousness.”273  Adler raises the example of the performance art of Karen Finley, 
which includes “smear[ing] food into her genitals . . . defecat[ing] onstage” and 
graphic descriptions of “violent and bizarre sex acts with priests, children, relatives, 
and the handicapped.”274  Finley and anyone else who makes sexually explicit art is 
at risk of prosecution; “the chilling effect is incalculable.”275 
The chilling effect is especially incalculable in the case of art involving 
intersecting themes of children, pedophilia and sex.  Support is scarce for those 
who experiment with issues of child sexuality in their work.  For instance, the 
release of Adrian Lyne’s 1997 film adaptation of Nabokov’s Lolita was delayed, or 
the film itself was banned, in several countries.276  One of the stars of the film, 
Jeremy Irons, commented, “The whole subject [of pedophilia] should be discussed 
sensibly, rationally, morally, kindly and generously without the tabloid headlining, 
opinion-making rubbish that is spewed out by moralists and politicians who want to 
jump on a bandwagon.”277  It is easy to jump on the bandwagon of censorship of 
sexually explicit materials concerning children, though, in a culture where child 
molestation is seen as “worse than murder.”278  The review rightly asks the 
following questions to highlight the threat to the arts that such censorship entails: 
“If Lolita should be banned under the bogus banner of preventing paedophilia why 
stop there?  Why not ban Shakespeare or ancient Greek tragedy where incest, rape 
and other acts of violence abound?”279 
The foregoing examples involve known works either already widely accepted as 
 
 270. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (announcing three-part test). 
 271. Amy Adler, Note, Post-Modern Art and the Death of Obscenity Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1359, 
1364 (1990) [hereinafter Adler, Post-Modern Art]. 
 272. Id. at 1369. 
 273. Id. at 1367–69. 
 274. Id. at 1369. 
 275. Id. at 1373. 
 276. See Richard Phillips, A Mature Film About Sexual Obsession, WORLD SOCIALIST WEB SITE 
(Apr. 9, 1999), http://www.wsws.org/articles/1999/apr1999/lol-a09.shtml. 
 277. Id. 
 278. KINCAID, EROTIC, supra note 18, at 202. 
 279. Phillips, supra note 276. 
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valuable works of art or acknowledged as deliberately, politically provocative.  The 
chilling effects of Whorley and the PROTECT Act, however, are even more 
insidious for recent works that have yet to enter the protection of the canon.  In A. 
M. Homes’s The End of Alice, for instance, the speaker writes from prison, where 
he sits for the extremely gruesome rape and murder of a young girl, which is 
recounted in passages that includes decapitation, genital mutilation and post-
mortem intercourse.280  The novel’s intent to disturb and get under our skin is 
apparent in the first paragraph, which encapsulates all of the contradictions and 
tensions discussed above: 
Who is she that she should have this afflicted addiction, this oddly acquired taste for 
the freshest of flesh, to tell a story that will start some of you smirking and smiling, 
but that will leave others set afire determined this nightmare, this horror, must stop.  
Who is she?  What will frighten you most is knowing she is either you or I, one of us.  
Surprise.  Surprise.281 
Critic Daphne Merkin, reviewing The End of Alice in the New York Times, 
begins by asking:  “What can you say about a 19-year-old girl who likes to chew on 
fresh scabs from the knee of a 12-year-old boy?  What can you say about a love 
story that . . . stops at various depraved stations . . . ?”282  Merkin continues, 
[Homes’s] book does boast enough graphic—even lurid—sexual description to bring 
out the Pat Buchanan lurking inside the most sophisticated of readers, but . . . some 
critics . . . have reacted as though the author had committed an actual offense for 
which she should be handcuffed and led away, rather than what one might call a crime 
of the imagination.283 
Merkin calls the book “not particularly likable,” which might be putting it 
lightly.284  However, she also observes that the book’s “best moments are quietly 
observed and [its] underlying themes are more serious than prurient.  ‘The End of 
Alice’ is concerned with the fluid nature of identity . . . .”285  Merkin further 
speculates that “one of Ms. Homes’s implicit intentions . . . is precisely to perforate 
the text, to violate the courteous and airtight space that is presumed to exist 
between any given work and its audience . . . the author . . . keeps homing in on 
‘Herr Reader’ the better to implicate him in the ugly goings-on.”286  But ultimately, 
the issue lies not in the novel’s merits; it lies in the fact that we cannot have debates 
about its merits if the novel itself is chilled by the threat of criminalization. 
Underlying these legal discussions of artistic merit and the protection of art is 
the anxiety that comes with the specter of pedophilia.  When someone creates a 
 
 280. A. M. HOMES, THE END OF ALICE 269 (1996). 
 281. Id. at 11. 
 282. Daphne Merkin, Random Objects of Desire, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 1996, at 14 (reviewing A. 
M. HOMES, supra note 280). 
 283. Id. 
 284. Id. 
 285. Id. 
 286. Id. 
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fiction involving children in sexual situations, several fears arise.  Attorney 
Lawrence Stanley observes: 
For many, the depiction of nude minors raises fears that such depictions may sexually 
stimulate some individuals or motivate them to act in a sexual way with a minor.  
Others perceive such depictions to be symbolic of sexual license gone awry. . . .  
[W]hat if the photographer actually has erotic feelings for his or her subject?287 
We may jump to the defense of Homes as a “serious” writer, but where did the 
novel’s fantasies come from?  Homes’s novel may have more in common with the 
fantasies revealed in Whorley’s email correspondences than we may care to 
acknowledge.  But the point is not to insinuate that Homes is a pedophile.  The 
point is to question the dividing line between the monsters and the rest of us, and to 
ask what we really fear when we cast them out. 
Judge Gregory argues that “writings describing sexual acts between children and 
adults, generated by fantasy,” may have “socially redeeming artistic value.”288  Of 
art, Adler writes, “As soon as we put up a boundary [of what “art” is] an artist will 
violate it . . . .”289  It is this instability of art—what it is, why an artist chooses the 
subject she does, how she deals with it, why boundary crossings seem of such 
interest to her—that, combined with the threat of pedophilia, helps create the 
impulse to put up a wall of any kind possible.  The obscenity provisions in the 
PROTECT Act are an example.  Although Judge Niemeyer attempts to provide a 
tidy ending to Whorley’s case—he violated federal obscenity laws, and that is all—
Judge Gregory’s worried speculations about the future of artistic expression in the 
Fourth Circuit (and possibly beyond) spill over.  Judge Gregory is persuasive on 
this point, and it is not only the fantasies of pedophiles that are at risk.  As one 
commentator notes, “the same justifications used to suppress pedophiles’ free 
speech rights could also be used to curtail the rights of gays, interracial couples, 
and any group not in the majority.”290  In fact, at certain historical points, it was 
“homosexuals,” racial minorities and immigrants that served as cultural “monsters” 
needing punishment and containment.291  As the Court stated in 1969, before 
Miller, Ferber or the panic over pedophilia and child molestation took hold of 
society, “Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving 
government the power to control men’s minds.”292 
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IV.  CONCLUSION 
“The 20 cartoons forming the basis of [counts one through twenty] showed 
prepubescent children engaging in graphic sexual acts with adults.  They depicted 
actual intercourse, masturbation, and oral sex, some of it coerced.”293  The fictional 
children, whoever they were, were “show[n]” having “actual intercourse” (by 
which we might assume the court means penetrative sex), masturbation and oral 
sex, some—only some—of it “coerced.”  The court does not describe the cartoons 
further.  How the fictional children were coerced, and how we are to know, remains 
a mystery.  The fictional children remain safe—that is, fictional, now that Whorley 
has been caught and convicted.  Whorley’s taste for fictional children will not, for 
at least the term of his sentence, be transformed into a danger to real children.  But 
what about the stranger, the doctor, the teacher, the priest, Michael Jackson’s 
ghost?294  We may not have to “worry” about Phillip R. Greaves, the author of The 
Pedophile’s Guide to Love and Pleasure, discussed supra, either.295  He was 
arrested in December of 2010 after mailing a copy of his book from Colorado to 
Florida on charges of “distribution of obscene material depicting minors engaged in 
harmful conduct . . . a third-degree felony.”296 
Philip Jenkins, writing in 2001, stated, “though virtually any visual images 
involved in this trade [of child pornography] are prohibited, words are subject to 
constitutional protections.”297  Jenkins counted on these protections to do his 
research online.298  These protections are clearly being eroded.  Judge Gregory, 
dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc in 2009, wrote, “I am hard pressed 
to think of a better modern day example of government regulation of private 
thoughts than what we have before us in this case: convicting a man for the 
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victimless ‘crime’ of privately communicating his personal fantasies to other 
consenting adults.”299  This Note has tried to lend support to Judge Gregory’s 
dissenting opinions (no other judge on his circuit has done so) and to highlight the 
background of the case and the issues surrounding it.  At least two Justices on the 
Supreme Court have recognized Congress’s efforts to legislate around the Court’s 
holdings regarding child pornography.300  This Note has argued that the courts have 
participated in larger cultural narratives of this historical moment regarding 
pedophilia and children, and that deeper and more courageous thought about these 
cultural narratives and the courts’ participation in them is necessary.  The point is 
not to “advocate the rights of pedophiles,” nor is it to excuse the harms they may 
cause, nor is it to impugn the efforts to address those harms when they occur.  But 
when the freedoms of expression, speech and thought are themselves at stake, more 
thought into how these stakes have been constructed is critical. 
As British psychotherapist Adam Phillips has argued, “One can, and should, 
disapprove of the sexual abuse of children without denying that it raises some 
unsettling questions about sexuality, about its uncertain measure in our lives.”301  
Having the “right to use our imaginations to create fantasies” sometimes means 
being left with extremely unsettling questions, fears and anxieties, which, like 
sexuality itself, “a story which can never be brought to a close,” cannot be 
legislated, judged or wished away.302 
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